University of North Carolina School of Law

Carolina Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2020

The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention
Ifeoma Ajunwa
University of North Carolina School of Law, ajunwa@email.unc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Publication: Cardozo Law Review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

THE PARADOX OF AUTOMATION AS ANTI-BIAS
INTERVENTION
Ifeoma Ajunwa †

A received wisdom is that automated decision-making serves as an anti-bias
intervention. The conceit is that removing humans from the decision-making process
will also eliminate human bias. The paradox, however, is that in some instances,
automated decision-making has served to replicate and amplify bias. With a case study
of the algorithmic capture of hiring as a heuristic device, this Article provides a
taxonomy of problematic features associated with algorithmic decision-making as
anti-bias intervention and argues that those features are at odds with the fundamental
principle of equal opportunity in employment. To examine these problematic features
within the context of algorithmic hiring and to explore potential legal approaches to
rectifying them, the Article brings together two streams of legal scholarship: law &
technology studies and employment & labor law.
Counterintuitively, the Article contends that the framing of algorithmic bias as
a technical problem is misguided. Rather, the Article’s central claim is that bias is
introduced in the hiring process, in large part, due to an American legal tradition of
deference to employers, especially allowing for such nebulous hiring criterion as
“cultural fit.” The Article observes the lack of legal frameworks to account for the
emerging technological capabilities of hiring tools which make it difficult to detect bias.
The Article discusses several new approaches to hold liable for employment
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discrimination both employers and makers of algorithmic hiring systems. Particularly
related to Title VII, the Article proposes that in legal reasoning corollary to extant tort
doctrines, an employer’s failure to audit and correct its automated hiring platforms for
disparate impact should serve as prima facie evidence of discriminatory intent, for the
proposed new doctrine of discrimination per se. The Article also considers approaches
separate from employment law, such as establishing consumer legal protections for job
applicants that would mandate their access to the dossier of information consulted by
automated hiring systems in making the employment decision.
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INTRODUCTION
The automation of decision-making processes via machine learning
algorithmic systems presents itself as a legal paradox. On one hand, such
automation is often an attempt to prevent unlawful discrimination, 1 but
on the other hand, there is evidence that algorithmic decision-making
processes may thwart the purposes of antidiscrimination laws such as
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 and may instead serve to
reproduce inequalities at scale. 3 Consider the recent discovery that the
commerce company, Amazon, had secretly disbanded its algorithmic
hiring system. 4 In October of 2018, the news service, Reuters, reported
that Amazon’s engineering team in Edinburgh, Scotland, had created 500
computer models that it used to “trawl through past candidates’ résumés
and pick up on about 50,000 key terms.” 5 Using those selected key terms,
“[t]he system would crawl the web to recommend candidates.” 6 Within a
year of using the automated system, however, the engineers observed that

1 “Advocates applaud the removal of human beings and their flaws from the assessment
process.” Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014). Algorithms or automated systems are often seen as fair
because they are “claimed to rate all individuals in the same way, thus averting discrimination.” Id.
2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2018).
3 See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671 (2016) (detailing issues of disparate impact associated with algorithmic decision-making);
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY
AND INFORMATION (2015) (detailing legal issues associated with the non-transparent use of
algorithmic decision-making in several societal spheres); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69
ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 87 (2017) (“This new family of algorithms holds enormous promise, but also
poses new and unusual dangers.”); see also VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW
HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018); SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE,
ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018); CATHY O’NEIL,
WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS
DEMOCRACY (2016); cf. Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019) (arguing
that the problem of disparate impact in predictive risk algorithms lies not in the algorithmic system
but in the nature of prediction itself).
4 Isobel Asher Hamilton, Amazon Built an AI Tool to Hire People but Had to Shut It Down
Because It Was Discriminating Against Women, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2018, 5:47 AM),
www.businessinsider.com/amazon-built-ai-to-hire-people-discriminated-against-women-201810 [https://perma.cc/9W55-RZYP].
5 Id.
6 Id.
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the results of the automated hiring system were unfavorable to women
applicants; the automated hiring system preferred men. 7
A potential cause: The computer models were trained on
predominantly male resumes, with the result that the system concluded
that men were preferred candidates; thus, it “downgraded résumés
containing the word ‘women’s’ and filtered out candidates who had
attended two women-only colleges.” 8 As legal scholars such as Professor
Sandra Mayson and others have demonstrated, such algorithmic bias is
not limited to gender; algorithmic decision-making can also produce
disparate racial impact, especially in the criminal justice system. 9
Amazon’s story of negative discrimination against protected classes as an
(un)intended outcome of automated decision-making is not singular.
Recent books, like Algorithms of Oppression, have detailed the raciallybiased impact of algorithms on information delivery on the internet,10
and others, like Automating Inequality, have outlined the biased results
of algorithms in criminal justice and public welfare decision-making, 11
yet, with the exception of the work of a few legal scholars, 12 the role of

Id.
Id. Ironically, as the use of an automated hiring system revealed the gender disparity here in
concrete numbers, this meant that such disparities could potentially be addressed by employment
antidiscrimination law. Contrast this to what the legal scholar Professor Jessica Fink has identified
as the more nebulous “gender sidelining,” a workplace dynamic in which, for example, “[w]omen
often lack access to important opportunities or feel subjected to greater scrutiny than their male
peers.” Jessica Fink, Gender Sidelining and the Problem of Unactionable Discrimination, 29 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 57 (2018).
9 More often, legal scholars have considered algorithmic racial inequities in the context of the
criminal justice system. See, e.g., Mayson, supra note 3 (arguing that the problem of disparate
impact in predictive risk algorithms lies not in the algorithmic system but in the nature of
prediction itself); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043
(2019); Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a
Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2408 (2017); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big
Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327 (2015).
10 See NOBLE, supra note 3.
11 See EUBANKS, supra note 3.
12 See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 570 (2018)
[hereinafter Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms]; Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless
Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1056 (2017) [hereinafter Bornstein, Reckless
Discrimination]; Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
857, 908 (2017); Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia L. McCormick & Jintong Tang, The
Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 961 (2017); Charles A. Sullivan, Employing
7
8
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algorithms in perpetuating inequality in the labor market has been
relatively overlooked in legal scholarship. 13
Often, when legal scholars raise the topic of bias in algorithmic
systems, a common retort is: “What’s new?” 14 This rhetorical question is
meant to convey the sentiment that bias in algorithmic systems cannot be
a novel topic of legal inquiry because it has a pre-existing corollary, bias
in human decision-making. However, scholars such as Professor Jack
Balkin have exposed this retort as a facile dismissal of what are legitimate
lines of scholarly legal inquiry.
[T]o ask “What is genuinely new here?” is to ask the wrong
question. If we assume that a technological development is
important to law only if it creates something utterly new, and we
can find analogues in the past—as we always can—we are likely
to conclude that because the development is not new, it changes
nothing important. That is the wrong way to think about
technological change and public policy, and in particular, it is
the wrong way to think about the Internet and digital
technologies. Instead of focusing on novelty, we should focus on
salience. What elements of the social world does a new
technology make particularly salient that went relatively
unnoticed before? What features of human activity or of the
human condition does a technological change foreground,
emphasize, or problematize? And what are the consequences for
human freedom of making this aspect more important, more
pervasive, or more central than it was before? 15

AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395 (2018); James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible
Discrimination, 7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 164 (2017).
13 Going beyond the specific role of algorithms, some scholars have argued that workplaces in
the United States are essentially allowed to operate as self-contained, self-governing bodies, without
much scrutiny or oversight from regulatory bodies in regard to how the workplace is structured
and organized. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR
LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) (2017) (making the argument that workplaces have
become authoritarian private governments with little protection for the worker from the state).
14 See, e.g., Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1148 (2000)
(“[F]ew of the legal issues posed by the new informatics technologies are novel.”).
15 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004).
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Other legal scholars have made similar points. As Professor Katyal
notes: “the true promise of AI does not lie in the information we reveal to
one another, but rather in the questions it raises about the interaction of
technology, property, and civil rights.” 16 My scholarly agenda has focused
on examining the myriad ways in which new computing technologies
bring to high relief existing societal biases and continued inequities,
particularly in the employment sphere. In past work, I have parsed how
online platforms might contribute to age discrimination in the labor
market, 17 and I have noted how wearable technologies deployed to
manage the workplace prompt novel legal questions and suggest a new
agenda for employment and labor law scholarship. 18 I have also
conducted an empirical study of work algorithms, which involved a
critical discourse analysis and affordance critique of the advertised
features and rhetoric behind automated hiring systems as gleaned
through 135 archival texts, tracing the timeline of the development of
hiring platforms from 1990–2006. 19 That study concluded that while one
purported raison d’etre and advertised purpose of automated hiring
systems was to reduce hirer bias—“replacing messy human decisions with
a neutral technical process” 20—the reality remained that “algorithmic
specification of ‘fit’ can itself become a vehicle for bias.” 21
Deploying a case study of the algorithmic capture of hiring as a
heuristic device, this Article makes several important contributions to

16 Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV.
54, 54 (2019).
17 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Age Discrimination by Platforms, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2019).
18 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Algorithms at Work: Productivity Monitoring Applications and Wearable
Technology as the New Data-Centric Research Agenda for Employment and Labor Law, 63 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 21 (2018).
19 Ifeoma Ajunwa & Daniel Greene, Platforms at Work: Automated Hiring Platforms and Other
New Intermediaries in the Organization of Work, in WORK AND LABOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE 61
(Steven P. Vallas & Anne Kovalainen eds., 2019).
20 Id. “From a diversity perspective, artificial intelligence can be very beneficial . . . because it’s
blind to things like color, age, sexual orientation.” Jeff Meredith, AI Identifying Steady Workers,
CHI. TRIB. (July 16, 2001), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2001-07-160107160013-story.html [https://perma.cc/K2D7-J37S].
21 Ajunwa & Greene, supra note 19. Consider that Unicru’s instruction manuals for users of its
hiring platforms encourages them to “clone your best people” with the identification of existing
high-sales employees within client records. A process that would be sure to replicate existing
inequalities in the demographics of the workers. Ajunwa & Greene, supra note 19.
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two streams of legal scholarship: employment & labor law and law &
technology studies. First, the Article provides a taxonomy of problematic
features associated with algorithmic decision-making as anti-bias
intervention and argues that those features contradict the American
bedrock principle of equal opportunity in employment. I observe that one
faction of law and technology legal scholars has become preoccupied with
determining the legal guidelines to ensure fair automated decisionmaking, 22 while in employment and labor law, the concern is preserving
equal opportunity for protected classes to obtain a livelihood; 23 these may
represent disjointed interests given that technically fair systems may
replicate historic inequalities.
Note that consistent with the approach of legal scholars like
Professor Benjamin Sachs, I do not see employment law and labor law as
“dichotomous, and in a fundamental respect incompatible, regulatory
regimes.” 24 Rather, any worker gains accomplished via employment law
may be leveraged towards collective bargaining, and thus, “employment
law can in fact function as a substitute form of labor law—as the locus of
workers’ organizational activity and as the legal mechanism that insulates
that activity from employer interference.”25 Furthermore, I argue that any
clarity this Article affords in regard to combating algorithmic bias in
employment decision-making may also be deployed to bargain for better,
more probative hiring criteria.
However, law & technology studies and employment & labor law
studies, as different schools of legal thought, approach the issue of
algorithmic bias in divergent ways; the law & technology approach to bias
has, thus far, with a few emerging exceptions, been from an anti-

22 Other scholars have also noted that this faction exists. See generally Ferguson, supra note 9;
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 4; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 3.
23 Cynthia Estlund has argued that Title VII should be understood as an “equal protection
clause for the workplace.” Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 331 (2005); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn
and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40–41 (2006) (arguing that the best
explanation for employment discrimination law is its reflection of a broad goal of social change to
eliminate group-based status inequalities).
24 Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2688 (2008).
25 Id. at 2689.
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classificationist approach, 26 wherein the focus is on the improper use of
variables for protected classes in the decision-making process. 27 In the
context of hiring, such an emphasis would revolve around the disparate
treatment cause of action under Title VII. 28 Whereas employment &
labor law literature now mostly focuses on anti-subordination, where the
concern is the adverse impact of decision-making on protected groups,
which mostly implicates the disparate impact theory under Title VII.29
26 Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003) (relating the history of the development and
application of the two distinct antidiscrimination threads in American law); see also Jessica L.
Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 597, 631 (2011). Roberts notes:

These two versions of the antidiscrimination principle employ differing accounts of the
meaning of equality. The antisubordination principle roughly holds that covered entities
should not act in a way that reinforces the social status of subjugated groups.
Antisubordination would, therefore, permit affirmative action designed to improve the
status of a disadvantaged group and forbid facially neutral policies that perpetuate
lowered group status, even absent the intent to discriminate. Its complement, the
anticlassification principle, maintains that covered entities should not consider certain
classes of forbidden traits under any circumstance, adopting a formal equal treatment
model of equality.
Id. at 627–28.
27 See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg,
David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017). For a
notable exception, see generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 3 (detailing issues of disparate impact
associated with algorithmic decision-making).
28 Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
29 Title VII explicitly prohibits employers from using any “particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). But see Bradley A. Areheart, Information Privacy: GINA, Privacy, and
Antisubordination, 46 GA. L. REV. 705, 709 (2012). Areheart argues that “GINA . . . [represents] a
turn toward anticlassificationist principles (and a possible turn away from antisurbodination
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This Article seeks to reconcile this gulf by noting first that machine
learning algorithmic systems present opportunities for both disparate
treatment and disparate impact discriminatory actions. 30 The Article then
notes the particular difficulties of proving a disparate impact theory of
discrimination when machine learning algorithmic systems have played
a role in the employment decision-making process.
As a second contribution, I argue that too often law & technology
scholarship displays a too narrow focus on technical definitions of
fairness and overlooks the reality that facially neutral variables may still
(in)advertently stand in for protected variables, thus meaning that there
could still be a disparate impact on protected classes even when machine
learning algorithms are technically fair. 31 As a result of this myopic view,
algorithmic bias, particularly in employment, has been framed as a
technical problem, rather than as a matter of inadequate law. This offers
a facile dismissal of algorithmic bias as a non-novel problem that could
be solved by technical tinkering, or even as a non-problem since some
argue that algorithmic systems represent an improvement from human
decision-making.
To be sure, human managers hold biases that are reflected in
unfavorable employment decisions for protected classes, but the impact
of one biased human manager is constrained in comparison to the
potential adverse reach of algorithms that could be used to exclude
millions of job applicants from viewing a job advertisement or to sort
thousands of resumes. The new phenomenon of concern here is that due
to the “volume, velocity, and variety” 32 of data used in automated hiring,
any bias introduced in the system will be magnified and multiplied,

norms).” Id.; cf. Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, supra note 12, at 571. Professor
Bornstein asserts that in addition to anticlassification and antisubordination theories underlying
antidiscrimination law, antistereotyping principles should be considered since algorithmic
discrimination can be liable for intentional discrimination as well as disparate impact.
30 See Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law,
66 STAN. L. REV. 1381 (2014) (noting that concepts in employment law such as “intent” and
“causation” escape precise definition).
31 See generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 3.
32 This refers to the three V’s of big data. David Gewirtz, Volume, Velocity, and Variety:
Understanding the Three V’s of Big Data, ZDNET: DIY-IT (Mar. 21, 2018, 7:47 AM), https://
www.zdnet.com/article/volume-velocity-and-variety-understanding-the-three-vs-of-big-data
[https://perma.cc/BH4Z-ALK9].
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greatly dwarfing the impact of any prejudice held by any one human
manager.
A few caveats are in order for a useful reading of this Article. First, I
remain agnostic as to whether the problems of biased algorithmic
decision-making in hiring can or should be neatly classified as either
disparate treatment or disparate impact. Rather, in addition to these two
established legal theories for liability, I draw from organizational theory
to offer my new theory of the automated hiring platform as a tertius
bifrons. 33 The hope is that such theorization will help provide support for
updated legal frameworks 34 to better address what I describe as the novel
sociological phenomenon of the algorithmic capture 35 of employment.
Second, perhaps in the same genre as the “what’s new?” question,
there’s the question of whether automated decision-making is better than
human decision-making. The aim of this Article is not to argue for or
against algorithmic decision-making in the workplace; rather, it is to
ensure that the law is able to root out and redress any problems associated
with that practice, much the same as the law governs human decisionmaking. Furthermore, I do not believe that an adjudication of whether or
not algorithms are less biased than humans36 is necessary to advocate for
better laws to curb the demonstrated potential of algorithms to
sometimes return biased results. First, an adjudication of whether hiring
33 See infra Section IV.A; see also GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 145–69
(Kurt H. Wolff ed., trans., 1950) (establishing the typology of a triad with a “tertius” as broker).
34 I agree with these sentiments set forth by Professor Selmi: “Employment discrimination law
has long been ripe for updating. Many of the core cases regarding how discrimination is defined
and proved arose in the 1970s in a very different era and were designed to address very different
kinds of discrimination.” Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law:
Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 938 (2014).
35 See infra Section II.A.
36 I firmly believe that whether or not hiring algorithms produce more or less biased results
than humans cannot be a legal adjudication. As Professor Charles Sullivan has remarked: “And the
antidiscrimination statutes don’t really care whether any particular selection device actually
improves productivity so long as it does not discriminate.” Sullivan, supra note 12, at 398. Rather,
determining whether algorithmic systems evince less bias than human managers requires empirical
data obtained via rigorous social scientific research. Some legal scholars have argued, based on
preliminary studies, that automated hiring systems have “allowed some employers to easily and
dramatically reduce the biasing effects of subjectivity from their hiring decisions.” Bornstein,
Reckless Discrimination, supra note 12, at 1056. I argue, however, that since algorithmic hiring
systems are a relatively new invention, to assess any bias reduction would require longitudinal
studies in several industries, and with adequate controls.
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platforms are more or less biased than humans is not a legal one—rather,
it is a social scientific one that demands rigorous longitudinal research.
Although there is some research, as proffered by Professor Bornstein in
her article Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 37 showing automated hiring to
be less biased, the relative novelty of hiring platforms brings to question
the rigor of such studies.
I also do not believe that an actual adjudication of whether hiring
platforms are less biased than humans or not is necessary before there can
be new legal frameworks specifically designed to govern automated
decision-making in hiring. Professor Julie Cohen makes this argument
clear in her article, Law for the Platform Economy. 38 Much like our present
laws have been developed to govern human decision-making, we need
new legal frameworks to govern emerging new technologies in the
workplace. My third and most important point here: to argue for or
against automated decision-making versus human decision-making is to
create a false binary. It is to willfully forget that the human hand remains
present in all automated decision-making. 39
A final caveat, this Article operates from the normative standard of
a social contract society and asks not just how business efficiency can be
achieved through algorithmic decision-making while toeing to the letter
of employment antidiscrimination law but, rather, how the societal goal
of equality and the spirit of antidiscrimination laws meant to accomplish
that goal could be honored, even in the face of the automation of
employment decision-making. This Article also affirms worker diversity
as a normative business and societal ideal. While much can be said about
the ethical benefits of a diverse workforce, particularly in regard to
reducing economic inequality and its attendant negative effects, 40 a
diverse workplace also affords business advantage because diverse
workplaces evince greater innovation and better decision-making. 41
Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, supra note 12.
Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 189 (2017).
39 See infra Section II.C.
40 Some research demonstrates that greater inequality is correlated to violence, incarceration,
drug abuse, obesity, teenage pregnancy, and mental health issues. See generally RICHARD
WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETY
STRONGER (2009).
41 Sheen S. Levine, Evan P. Apfelbaum, Mark Bernard, Valerie L. Bartelt, Edward J. Zajac &
David Stark, Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18,524 (2014)
37
38
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Therefore, I push for a Rawlesian 42 approach to the governance of
automated hiring systems, wherein the focus is on institutional
approaches to algorithmic decision-making and their impact on society
as a whole. In so doing, rather than merely proposing ways to build fairer
algorithmic systems as some other legal scholars have done, 43 I argue that
we should also interrogate what values are given precedence by the turn
to algorithmic decision-making and by the legal deference accorded
employers in determining hiring criteria.
The Article is then organized as follows: Part I discusses the
“algorithmic turn” and three problematic features of big-data-driven
algorithmic decision-making: 1) data objectivity, 2) data as oracle, and 3)
data-laundering. Part II details the algorithmic capture of the workplace,
including the notion that automation in hiring is presented as an antibias intervention, and notes several examples of bias in both algorithmic
recruitment and hiring. Part III urges a reframing of the problem of
algorithmic bias, notably with the argument that bias in algorithmic
hiring is not a technical problem but rather a legal one borne from a
tradition of deference to employers, especially in regard to non-probative
hiring criterion such as “cultural fit.” Based on original theorization of
platform authoritarianism and the tertius bifrons, Part IV proposes new
(detailing sociological research showing that diverse teams make better decisions and are more
innovative); see also Katherine W. Phillips, Katie A. Liljenquist & Margaret A. Neale, Better
Decisions Through Diversity, KELLOGG SCH. MGMT.: KELLOGGINSIGHT (Oct. 1, 2010), https://
insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/better_decisions_through_diversity [https://perma.cc/
7NDF-QNS6] (showing that diverse groups outperform homogenous groups because of both an
influx of new ideas and more careful information processing); Sheen S. Levine & David Stark,
Diversity Makes You Brighter, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/
opinion/diversity-makes-you-brighter.html [https://perma.cc/EW4T-DH7Q].
42 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Rawls, a social contract philosopher, argued that
the competing claims of freedom and equality could be reconciled when decisions about justice are
made on the basis of the difference principle behind a “veil of ignorance,” wherein no one individual
knows their original position (that is, they could be members of low status groups in society), with
the result that the only rational choice is to make decisions that would improve the position of the
worst off in society. Id.; see also Mark Kelman, Defining the Antidiscrimination Norm to Defend It,
43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 737 (2006) (rejecting “the [utilitarian ethics] idea that the
antidiscrimination norm’s propriety should be evaluated solely by reference to its impact on a mere
subset of experiences or capacities to engage in certain activities, for example, a claim that what is
relevant in deciding whether the plaintiff merits protection is the plaintiff’s legitimate sense that,
absent protection, he is not treated as a ‘first-class’ citizen”).
43 See, e.g., Kroll, Huey, Barocas, Felten, Reidenberg, Robinson & Yu, supra note 27.
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legal frameworks for addressing algorithmic discrimination in
employment that borrows from tort law to update employment law. Of
particular note here, is the idea that intent to discriminate could be
implied from the act of negligence 44 to audit and correct bias in
algorithmic hiring systems. Furthermore, Part IV discusses how
consumer protection laws might help ensure that the information
collection of algorithmic hiring systems does not amplify bias.
I. THE ALGORITHMIC TURN
Derived from the name of a Persian mathematician, al-Khwarizmi, 45
the word “algorithm” and the mathematical system of problem-solving it
stands for has gained prominence in all spheres of social and economic
life in the past three decades. 46 With advancements in computing
technologies and the capacity for rapid mining of big data, algorithms
now pervade our daily lives and exert influence over many important
decisions. 47 The algorithmic turn 48 is the profusion of algorithmic
44 Several other legal scholars have applied the tort law principle of a duty of care to
employment discrimination. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 30 (arguing that employment law imposes
a duty of care on employers to refrain from practices that go against equal opportunity in
employment); see also Robert Post, Lecture at the Brennan Center Symposium on Constitutional
Law, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, in 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1 (2000) (arguing that antidiscrimination law aims to achieve positive interventions in social
practices as opposed to solely dictating prohibitions). Other professors have also used a “duty of
care” framework to propose remedial measures for employment discrimination. See David
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993); Noah D. Zatz,
Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of
Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357 (2009).
45 DONALD E. KNUTH, STANFORD DEP’T OF COMPUT. SCI., ALGORITHMS IN MODERN
MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE 2 (1980).
46 Google Ngram shows the usage of the word “algorithm” beginning in the 1800s and rapidly
growing from the 1980s. Two recently published books document the widespread use of algorithms
both in governmental decision-making and in the delivery of search results online. See EUBANKS,
supra note 3; NOBLE, supra note 3.
47 See Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 393
(2014) (noting that “large datasets are being mined for important predictions and often surprising
insights”).
48 See Philip M. Napoli, On Automation in Media Industries: Integrating Algorithmic Media
Production into Media Industries Scholarship, 1 MEDIA INDUSTRIES J. 33 (2014). But note that I use
algorithmic turn here in a similar fashion as Professor Julie Cohen to denote a fad or trend towards
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decision-making in our daily lives, even in the absence of established
regulatory or ethical frameworks to guide the deployment of those
algorithms. 49 First, I note that the definition of the term “artificial
intelligence” (AI)50 varies in legal literature and in popular media, 51 and
thus, in this Article, in lieu of “AI,” I employ the more precise terms of
“algorithms” 52 and “machine learning algorithms.” 53

business practices that are, at their base, about capitalist control. See Julie E. Cohen, The
Surveillance-Innovation Complex: The Irony of the Participatory Turn, in THE PARTICIPATORY
CONDITION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 207, 207–26 (Darin Barney et al. eds., 2016).
49 See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88 (2014) (detailing gaps
in the law in regard to machine learning algorithms).
50 John McCarthy coined the term “AI” in his 1955 proposal for the 1956 Dartmouth
Conference, the inaugural AI conference. See Martin Childs, John McCarthy: Computer Scientist
Known as the Father of AI, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 1, 2011, 1:00 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/obituaries/john-mccarthy-computer-scientist-known-as-the-father-of-ai-6255307.html
[https://perma.cc/CE63-T3NU].
51 In most media, “artificial intelligence” and “algorithms” are used interchangeably. Lauri
Donahue writes about the process of machine learning, in which an algorithm learns from its
experiences and adapts to new sets of information, based on data. See Lauri Donahue, A Primer on
Using Artificial Intelligence in the Legal Profession, HARV. J.L. & TECH.: JOLT DIG. (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/a-primer-on-using-artificial-intelligence-in-the-legalprofession [https://perma.cc/E3KU-KYNH]. Donahue uses the terms AI and algorithm
interchangeably throughout the article.
52 In defining an algorithm, Alan D. Minsk references the Gottschalk v. Benson decision, in
which the court defined an algorithm as a “‘procedure for solving a given type of mathematical
problem’ . . . . [An algorithm is] . . . a ‘generalized formulation [for programs] to solve
mathematical problems of converting one form of numerical representation to another.’” Alan D.
Minsk, The Patentability of Algorithms: A Review and Critical Analysis of the Current Doctrine, 8
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 251, 257 (1992) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 65 (1972)). Minsk also references the Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. decision, which defines a mathematical algorithm and a computer
algorithm. A mathematical algorithm is a “recursive computational procedure [which] appears in
notational language, defining a computational course of events which is self-contained.” Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358,
1366–67 (D. Del. 1983) (“[A] computer algorithm is a procedure consisting of operation[s] to
combine data, mathematical principles and equipment for the purpose of interpreting and/or acting
upon a certain data input.”). In one of the earliest mentions of algorithms in case law, we find that
“algorithm[s] [are] procedure[s] for solving a given type of mathematical problem.” Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53 See PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE
LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD (2015) (“Every algorithm has an input and an
output: the data goes into the computer, the algorithm does what it will with it, and out comes the
result. Machine learning turns this around: in goes the data and the desired result and out comes
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Consider that an algorithm decides all of the following: the answer
to a search one conducts online, 54 the best romantic prospects provided
by a dating website, 55 what advertisements one sees during a visit to a
given website, 56 one’s creditworthiness, 57 whether or not one should be
considered a suspect for a crime, 58 and whether or not one is qualified for
a job. 59 As I detail in the following Sections, the algorithmic turn, as a
sociotechnical phenomenon in which we turn to machine learning
algorithms for efficiency in decision-making, evinces several features that
I ultimately see as problematic in various aspects.
A.

Data Objectivity

A common adage is “the numbers speak for themselves,” 60 and as
identified by previous researchers, this demonstrates an unquestioning

the algorithm that turns one into the other. Learning algorithms—also known as learners—are
algorithms that make other algorithms.”).
54 See, e.g., Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 11 ASS’N FOR COMPUTING
MACHINERY QUEUE 1 (2013) (detailing a study in which a search of names associated with AfricanAmericans returned results featuring advertisements for arrest records as a result of machine
learning by Google’s ad algorithm); see also NOBLE, supra note 3.
55 Leslie Horn, Here’s How OkCupid Uses Math to Find Your Match, GIZMODO (Feb. 14, 2013,
9:32 AM), http://gizmodo.com/5984005/heres-how-okcupid-uses-math-to-find-your-match
[https://perma.cc/8BLF-4ANE].
56 Thorin Klosowski, How Facebook Uses Your Data to Target Ads, Even Offline, LIFEHACKER
(Apr. 11, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://lifehacker.com/5994380/how-facebook-uses-your-data-totarget-ads-even-offline [https://perma.cc/J44C-HKFV] (explaining how Facebook uses your likes
(in addition to those of your friends) to tailor ads or target you for specific advertisements).
57 PASQUALE, supra note 3.
58 Ferguson, supra note 9 (noting that, although in the past, determining who was a suspect was
a more individualized process, police can now rely on large datasets to make probabilistic
determinations of criminal activity).
59 Claire Cain Miller, Can an Algorithm Hire Better than a Human?, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (June
25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/upshot/can-an-algorithm-hire-better-than-ahuman.html [https://perma.cc/2UDA-X2RE]; Sarah Green Carmichael, Hiring C-Suite Executives
by Algorithm, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 6, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/04/hiring-c-suite-executivesby-algorithm [https://perma.cc/RL3S-7B4C] (detailing how established headhunting firms like
Korn Ferry are incorporating algorithms into their work, too).
60 The author concludes: “With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves.” See, e.g., Chris
Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete, WIRED (June
23, 2008, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory [https://perma.cc/675W-PDFT].
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belief in data objectivity, particularly regarding large numbers of data.61
This, in turn, becomes a problematic feature of algorithmic systems—as
their decision-making relies on algorithms trained on a corpus of data,
the belief in data objectivity then often results in an uncritical acceptance
of decisions derived from such algorithmic systems. 62 In the article, Think
Again: Big Data, 63 Professor Kate Crawford disputes the reverence
accorded to big data. First, she argues that numbers do not speak for
themselves even with enough data because “data sets . . . are still objects
of human design,”64 which means that big data is not free from “skews,
gaps, and faulty assumptions.” 65 Biases can exist in big data as much as
they do in the real world with individual perceptions. 66
For one, Professor Crawford notes the “signal problems”67
associated with big data, which arise when citizens or subgroups are
underrepresented due to unequal creation or collection of data. She also
observes that more data does not necessarily improve transparency or
accountability; rather, mechanisms to aid the better interpretation of data
are more important. 68 Moreover, Professor Crawford argues that
although many believe that big data cause “less discrimination against
minority groups because raw data is somehow immune to social bias” 69
and help people avoid group-based discrimination at a mass level, 70 big
data may, in fact, contribute to the segregating of individuals into groups
because of its “ability to make claims about how groups behave
differently,” 71 an action forbidden by anti-classificationist laws.

61 Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 662
(2012).
62 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 60 (arguing that “[c]orrelation is enough” and that the
scientific method is now defunct).
63 Kate Crawford, Think Again: Big Data, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 10, 2013, 12:40 AM), https://
foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/10/think-again-big-data [https://perma.cc/T4F4-V54J].
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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These sentiments are echoed by the legal scholar Professor Anupam
Chander, who, in disavowal of data objectivity, argues for “algorithmic
affirmative action.” 72 Chander emphasizes that although algorithms are
perceived as fair because computers are logical entities, their results may
still bear the traces of real-world discrimination. He argues that
“[a]lgorithms trained or operated on a real-world data set that necessarily
reflects existing discrimination may well replicate that discrimination.”73
This means that because data are historically biased towards certain
groups or classes, discriminatory results may still emerge from automated
algorithms that are designed in racial- or gender-neutral ways. 74 Also,
discriminatory results can occur even when decision-makers are not
motivated to discriminate: “Because race or gender might be statistically
associated with an unobservable trait—such as worker productivity[75] or
propensity to remain in the labor market—profit-maximizing employers
might discriminate on the basis of race or gender, using the observable
characteristics as proxies for the unobservable traits.” 76 Thus, in addition
to the problem of intentional discrimination, “automated algorithms
offer a perhaps more ubiquitous risk: replicating real-world
inequalities.” 77

See Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1041 (2017).
Id. at 1036.
74 See id. at 1036–37.
75 It is important to clarify that neither I nor Professor Chander are denying that employers
have a vested interest in worker productivity. The issue here is how productivity is observed and
whether statistics for productivity are ever wholly objective and not tainted for bias when it comes
to protected categories.
76 Chander, supra note 72, at 1038.
77 Chander’s call for algorithmic affirmative action is rooted in the idea that it is necessary to
design algorithms in race- and gender-conscious ways to account for discrimination already
embedded in the data. Id. at 1039. This action goes along with what the Obama Administration
offered as an approach to handle big data: “[w]e need to develop a principle of ‘equal opportunity
by design’—designing data systems that promote fairness and safeguard against discrimination
from the first step of the engineering process and continuing throughout their lifespan.” EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS, OPPORTUNITY, AND
CIVIL RIGHTS 5–6 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/
ostp/2016_0504_data_discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XQT-9VYQ].
72
73
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Data as Oracle

Concomitant with the belief in data objectivity is the uncritical
acquiescence to data-driven algorithmic decision-making as the final
arbiter on any given inquiry. Thus, the results of algorithmic systems are
heeded as oracular proclamations; they are accepted at face value without
any attempt to analyze or further interpret them. In the article, Critical
Questions for Big Data, 78 the authors offer six provocations to
conversations about big data issues. They define big data as “a cultural,
technological, and scholarly phenomenon” 79 that rests on the interplay of
technology, which “maximiz[es] computation power and algorithmic
accuracy to gather, analyze, link, and compare large data sets,”80 and
analysis, which “identif[ies] patterns in order to make economic, social,
technical, and legal claims.” 81 Furthermore, they note that this analysis
carries with it a mythology, notably the prevalent belief that large data
sets offer better intelligence and knowledge, and could algorithmically
“generate insights that were previously impossible, [imbued] with the
aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy.” 82
What I term the phenomenon of data as oracle is best illustrated by
Chris Anderson, who proposes that, because of big data, the scientific
method is now defunct. 83 According to his article, the scientific approach
has traditionally consisted of three parts—hypothesize, model, and test. 84
As scientists know that correlation is not causation, they understand that
no conclusions should be based simply on correlation. 85 Anderson
argues, however, that this approach to science is becoming obsolete with
big data because petabytes of data allow people to conclude that
“[c]orrelation is enough.” 86 He places such trust in data and algorithms
that he believes that people can now “throw the numbers into the biggest

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Boyd & Crawford, supra note 61.
Id. at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Anderson, supra note 60.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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computing clusters the world has ever seen and let statistical algorithms
find patterns where science cannot.” 87
There is a danger, however, with treating algorithmic systems driven
by big data as oracles given that “[i]nterpretation is at the center of data
analysis” 88 and that without proper interpretation the decision-making of
algorithmic systems could devolve to apophenia, which results in “seeing
patterns where none actually exist, simply because enormous quantities
of data can offer connections that radiate in all directions.”89 Thus, when
approaching a data set and designing algorithmic systems on that data
set, researchers or interpreters should understand not only the limits of
the data set but also of which questions they can ask of a data set and
appropriate interpretations. 90
To illustrate the problem of apophenia for employment decisionmaking, consider this hypothetical example. Company A decides to use
an unsupervised machine learning algorithm to create a profile of the
ideal worker. As training data, Company A selects resumes of ten people
it considers high performers and trains its algorithm on this corpus of
resumes. It turns out that not only are the top ten performers men, but
they all listed rock climbing as a hobby on their resumes. The machine
learning algorithm thus deduces that the criteria for a good worker
includes not only being male but also being a rock climber. Now, if the
job position required above average upper body strength, then perhaps
this determination could be taken at face value. But what if not? If the job
advertised had no relation to upper body strength or really any of the
skills or characteristics of a rock climber, then the correct move is not to
treat this result as oracular truth, but rather to recognize it as the biased
result of a severely limited training data set.
If that hypothetical example seemed risible, then consider this reallife case. Mark J. Girouard, an employment attorney, recounts what

Id.
Boyd & Crawford, supra note 61, at 668.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 670. Professor Jim Greiner exposes the same type of problem in civil rights litigation,
when the use of regression analysis can prompt unjustified casual inferences. See D. James Greiner,
Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533 (2008).
87
88
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transpired when one of his clients audited 91 a resume screening tool. 92
The results: “After an audit of the algorithm, the resume screening
company found that the algorithm found two factors to be most
indicative of job performance [for applicants]: their name was Jared, and
whether they played high school lacrosse.” 93 As Girouard recounted,
ultimately, the client chose not to use the tool because although there
might be a statistically significant correlation between the data points, it
was difficult to argue that they were actually important to job
performance. 94
C.

Data-laundering

Perhaps an opposite problem to seeing patterns where there are
none is the potential for large data sets to be deployed to create patterns
based on faulty threads of causation, all with the goal of masking
intentional discrimination. I term this feature “data-laundering,” that is,
the use of data to “launder” or disguise intentional discrimination. In
their seminal article, Barocas and Selbst argue that existing law mostly
fails to address the discrimination that comes from data mining because
some instances of discriminatory data mining will not generate legal
liability under Title VII.95 Based on the idea that data mining is “always a
form of statistical . . . discrimination,”96 the authors describe five
mechanisms by which discriminatory outcomes might occur. The five
mechanisms are: 1) defining the target variable, 2) labeling and collecting
training data, 3) using feature selection, 4) using proxies, and 5) masking.
Notably, the authors argue “the definition of the target variable and its
associated class labels will determine what data mining happens to

91 This real-life case highlights exactly why I make the case in another law review article that
there ought to be an auditing imperative for hiring algorithms. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Automated
Employment Discrimination, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2021).
92 See Dave Gershgorn, Companies Are on the Hook if Their Hiring Algorithms Are Biased,
QUARTZ (Oct. 22, 2018), https://qz.com/1427621/companies-are-on-the-hook-if-their-hiringalgorithms-are-biased [https://perma.cc/69NT-AA55].
93 Id.
94 See id.
95 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 3, at 675.
96 Id. at 677.
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find,” 97 and concerns with discrimination enter at this stage because
whatever choices are selected will influence whether there are adverse
impacts on protected classes. 98
Secondly, labeling and collection of training data is important
because the effectiveness of data mining is dependent on the quality of
the data from which it draws lessons. 99 Data should serve as a good
sample of a protected group in order for data mining to be a
nondiscriminatory basis for future decision-making. 100 This is not always
the case, however, and in an act of data-laundering, the decision-maker
may choose to use data known to be incomplete or inaccurate. Next, the
authors indicate that organizations “make choices about what attributes
they observe and subsequently fold into their analyses” 101 through the
process of feature selection. This could result in a discriminatory impact
on legally protected classes if the factors that “better account for pertinent
statistical variation among members of a protected class are not well
represented in the set of selected features.” 102
For example, making an employment decision based on an
individual’s criminal record would have a disparate impact on protected
racial groups given that mass incarceration has disproportionately
impacted racial minorities in the United States. 103 Similarly, I would note
that using a lack of gaps in employment as a hiring criterion could
negatively impact women candidates as women disproportionately leave
the workplace to shoulder the family burden of child or elderly care.
Thus, as the authors note, the existence of proxies could also be a
mechanism that drives discrimination if “the criteria that are genuinely

Id. at 680.
Id.
99 Id. at 687.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 688.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 690; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (observing how mass incarceration in the United States is a
warehousing of the redundant labor population of Black American males and resembles a return
to Jim Crow era); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937 (2003)
(describing the racial disparities present in the use of criminal records in the hiring process); Ifeoma
Ajunwa, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2999 (2015) (arguing that Black
women are the most disadvantaged by the collateral consequences of conviction).
97
98
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relevant in making rational and well-informed decisions also happen to
serve as reliable proxies for class membership.” 104 As Barocas and Selbst
explain, decision-makers with prejudicial values can mask their
intentional discrimination as accidental by exploiting the mechanisms
above because the data mining process helps conceal the fact that those
decision-makers considered class membership. 105
II. ALGORITHMIC CAPTURE OF HIRING AS CASE STUDY
Given the described problems associated with algorithmic decisionmaking, the algorithmic capture of hiring is cause for concern. I use the
term algorithmic capture to describe the combined effect of the belief that
algorithms are more efficient and fairer 106 and the abdication of human
accountability for undesirable outcomes as a result of employing machine
learning algorithms as part of a decision-making process. Thus, my focus
here is on algorithmic work tools that are implicated in automating the
hiring process and thus in revolutionizing the workplace. 107 Although
there are several types of algorithmic hiring systems, I see them as falling
into two groups: 1) what I term “off-the shelf” algorithms that employers
can purchase or license, or 2) what I term “bespoke” algorithms that
employers can have a software developer create to their custom
specifications. While I would concede that intent and liability might be
analyzed differently for the employer depending on the type of algorithm
in question, ultimately, differences in hiring algorithms are less important
than the fact that although AI in the form of machine learning algorithms
has automated many work functions previously thought reserved for
human judgment,108 there have been scant new regulations to ensure that
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 3, at 691.
Id. at 692–93.
106 Boyd & Crawford, supra note 61 (noting the aura of efficiency associated with big data-driven
algorithms).
107 ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS,
AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES (2014) (arguing that akin to how the
Industrial Revolution changed the path of human invention, the artificial intelligence age will
similarly revolutionize work as we know it).
108 See Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 646 (2012) (discussing
how computer algorithms may find it difficult to decipher language changes that are readily
comprehensible to humans). But see, e.g., Erin Winick, Lawyer-Bots Are Shaking Up Jobs, MIT
104
105

2020]

THE PARADOX OF AUTOMATION

1693

these new technological developments will conform to the normative
ideal of equal economic opportunity for all, which is the bedrock of our
democratic society.
The automation of the hiring process represents a particularly
important technological trend and one that requires greater legal
attention given its potential for employment discrimination. Whereas
once, an applicant could rely on their interpersonal skills to make a
favorable first impression on the hiring manager, these days the hiring
algorithm is the initial hurdle to clear to gain employment. 109 This is
particularly true for the U.S. low-wage and hourly workforce, as a coauthor and I found through a survey of the top twenty private employers
in the Fortune 500 list (comprised of mostly retail companies). 110 That
survey indicated that job applications for such retail jobs must be
submitted online, where they will first be sorted by automated hiring
platforms powered by algorithms. 111
The algorithmic capture of the hiring process also goes beyond the
hourly workforce, as white collar and white shoe firms are increasingly
turning to hiring automation. 112 In 2016, the investment firm Goldman
Sachs announced a key change to its process for hiring summer interns

TECH. REV. (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609556/lawyer-bots-areshaking-up-jobs [https://perma.cc/246J-KGWP]; Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The
Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?, 114 TECHNOLOGICAL
FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 268 (2017) (“While computerisation has been historically
conﬁned to routine tasks involving explicit rule-based activities, algorithms for big data are now
rapidly entering domains reliant upon pattern recognition and can readily substitute for labour in
a wide range of non-routine cognitive tasks.”); ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER
TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE (2013).
109 See LINDA BARBER, INST. FOR EMP’T STUDIES, E-RECRUITMENT DEVELOPMENTS (2006),
https://www.employment-studies.co.uk/system/files/resources/files/mp63.pdf [https:/perma.cc/
KZ89-MCRC] (noting that nearly all Global 500 companies use e-recruitment and hire screening
algorithmic tools).
110 Ajunwa & Greene, supra note 19.
111 Id.
112 See, e.g., Richard Feloni, Consumer-Goods Giant Unilever Has Been Hiring Employees Using
Brain Games and Artificial Intelligence—And It’s a Huge Success, BUS. INSIDER (June 28, 2017, 9:30
AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/unilever-artificial-intelligence-hiring-process-2017-6
[https://perma.cc/TBG2-RF8K]; Louis Efron, How A.I. Is About to Disrupt Corporate Recruiting,
FORBES (July 12, 2016, 1:57 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/louisefron/2016/07/12/how-a-i-isabout-to-disrupt-corporate-recruiting/#75ae172d3ba2 [https://perma.cc/G5L3-AAWX].

1694

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1671

and first-year analysts. 113 Candidates now have their resumes scanned—
ostensibly by machine learning algorithms, in search of keywords and
experiences that have been prejudged to be “good barometers of a
person’s success at Goldman.” 114 Goldman Sachs has also considered the
addition of personality tests as part of its hiring program. 115 The world’s
largest hedge fund has taken the automation gambit the furthest, as
starting in 2016, it is building an algorithmic model that would automate
all management, including hiring, firing, and other managerial decisionmaking processes. 116 Thus, automated hiring represents an ecosystem in
which, if left unchecked, a closed loop system forms—with
algorithmically-driven advertisement determining which applicants will
send in their resumes, automated sorting of resumes leading to
automated onboarding and eventual automated evaluation of employees,
and the results of said evaluation being looped back into criteria for job
advertisement and selection.

113 Mary Thompson, Goldman Sachs Is Making a Change to the Way It Hires, CNBC (June 23,
2016, 3:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/23/goldman-sachs-is-making-a-change-to-theway-it-hires.html [https://perma.cc/3Y2X-3RMD].
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Rob Copeland & Bradley Hope, The World’s Largest Hedge Fund Is Building an Algorithmic
Model from Its Employees’ Brains, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2016, 1:14 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/the-worlds-largest-hedge-fund-is-building-an-algorithmic-model-of-its-founders-brain1482423694 [https://perma.cc/Z5MQ-5LRV].
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As algorithmic technological advances present us with
unprecedented legal challenges, 117 the use of machine learning algorithms
in decision-making hiring processes represents a particularly sensitive
legal issue because of the potential to create or exacerbate economic
inequality. Yet, even with headline-making cases of bias, the issue of how
to govern algorithmic systems remains a thorny one. In her article, Law
for the Platform Economy, Professor Julie Cohen notes that much of the
conduct of platforms is simply “intractable using conventional regulatory
methodologies.” 118 For instance:
to enforce existing antidiscrimination laws effectively, the
various agencies with enforcement authority need the ability to
detect and prove discrimination, yet that task is increasingly
difficult when decisions about lending, employment, and
housing are made via complex algorithms used to detect
patterns in masses of data and the data itself reflects preexisting
patterns of inequality. 119
Professor Cohen concludes that these phenomena combine to
constitute a space “devoid of protections for vital human freedoms, even
as the activities conducted in that space become more and more
fundamental to the exercise of those freedoms.” 120
In his article, Professor Anupam Chander analogizes the process of
“baby-proofing” to the concept of “future-proofing.” 121 To the question
“[d]oes the idea of ‘future-proofing’ law refer to a need to protect
the . . . future from the . . . legal system? Or, does it refer to a need to
protect . . . rule of law from the . . . future?” Professor Cohen responds

117 These legal challenges exist precisely because even with computing advancements that allow
computers to perform non-routine cognitive tasks, as noted by the legal scholar Cass Sunstein, “at
the present state of the art artificial intelligence cannot engage in analogical reasoning or legal
reasoning.” Kevin Ashley, Karl Branting, Howard Margolis & Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning
and Artificial Intelligence: How Computers “Think” like Lawyers, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1,
19 (2001); see Surden, supra note 49, at 88 (detailing gaps in the law in regards to machine learning
algorithms); see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 3, at 673–74 (detailing issues of disparate impact
associated with algorithmic decision-making).
118 Cohen, supra note 38, at 189.
119 Id. at 190.
120 Id. at 199.
121 See id. at 203.
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that neither alone is quite accurate. 122 This is because the law and
technological development are co-constitutive. Professor Cohen argues
that “legal institutions should change to meet the demands of the times,
and so it is only logical that the ascendancy of platforms should produce
new legal relationships and new institutional settlements.” 123 She
reinforces that it is time to pay attention to the best paths for institutional
evolution and the “extent to which legal institutions should bend to the
service of emergent economic power.” 124
I echo Professor Cohen’s sentiments here, particularly in cautioning
against a techno-correctionist view of algorithmic bias that focuses on
technical fairness in lieu of examining assumptions undergirding the
criteria chosen for automated decision-making. But in order to engender
new legal frameworks, we must first grasp the true nature of the issue. In
the following Sections, I detail how the move towards the automation of
decision-making came about as an anti-bias intervention and the ways in
which machine learning algorithms involved in hiring have been found
to return discriminatory results and raise new legal quandaries.
A.

Algorithms as Anti-Bias Intervention

The paradox of the algorithmic capture of hiring is that, despite
proof of algorithmic bias, some perceive the move to automated decisionmaking as an anti-bias intervention. That is, the increasing use of
algorithms in employment decision-making is seen as an improvement
in comparison to decisions made solely by humans. In Want Less-Biased
Decisions? Use Algorithms, 125 the author challenges many scholars’
concern that “algorithms are often opaque, biased, and unaccountable
tools being wielded in the interests of institutional power.” 126 He notes
that although these critiques have helped people to avoid abusing
algorithms, there is a pattern among the critiques, “which is that they
See id.
See id. at 204.
124 Id.
125 Alex P. Miller, Want Less-Biased Decisions? Use Algorithms., HARV. BUS. REV. (July 26, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/07/want-less-biased-decisions-use-algorithms
[https://perma.cc/RX6F6QDB].
126 Id.
122
123
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rarely ask how well the systems they analyze would operate without
algorithms.” 127
Miller cites multiple studies of algorithmic decision-making that
support the notion that “[a]lgorithms are less biased and more accurate
than the humans they are replacing.” 128 For instance, one study found
that a job-screening algorithm “actually favored ‘nontraditional’
candidates” 129 much more than human screeners did, “exhibit[ing]
significantly less bias against candidates that were underrepresented at
the firm.” 130 Other algorithmic studies related to credit applications,
criminal justice, public resource allocations, and corporate governance all
concluded that “[a]lgorithms are less biased and more accurate than the
humans they are replacing.” 131
In each of the examples he notes, Miller argues that the algorithm
programmers “trained their algorithms on past data that is surely biased
by historical prejudices.”132 Miller asserts that while this fact might be
alarming to many, because of the widespread belief that algorithms are
negatively affected by a biased data set, “the humans [algorithms] are
replacing are significantly more biased.” 133 He argues that a number of
psychological and other studies in judgment and decision have
demonstrated that “humans are remarkably bad judges of quality in a
wide range of contexts” 134 and that “very simple mathematical models
outperform supposed experts at predicting important outcomes.” Thus,
since humans are significantly bad at making decisions, “replacing them
with algorithms both increased accuracy and reduced institutional
biases.” 135 Miller refers to this as a “[p]areto improvement, where one
policy beats out the alternative on every outcome [people] care about.”136
He also emphasizes that there is no trade-off between productivity and
fairness when using algorithms because “[a]lgorithms deliver more127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
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efficient and more-equitable outcomes.” 137 Miller thus insists that even if
technology cannot fully solve the social ills of institutional bias and
discrimination, it is worthwhile to “accept that—in some instances—
algorithms will be part of the solution for reducing institutional biases”138
because the perils of human bias are far worse.
Similarly, the legal scholar Professor Stephanie Bornstein, in her
article Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 139 challenges the current focus on
ensuring that algorithmically derived decision-making results are not
discriminatory. She emphasizes the original intent of technology, which
is “to improve upon human decision-making by suppressing biases to
make the most efficient and least discriminatory decisions.” 140 Deploying
the example of Amazon’s hiring algorithm and LinkedIn’s survey
results, 141 Professor Bornstein notes that “[a]lgorithmic decision-making
offers unprecedented potential to reduce the stereotypes and implicit
biases that often infect human decisions.”142 However, Professor
Bornstein acknowledges that despite the promise of algorithms to reduce
bias in decision-making, there are concerns about algorithmic
discrimination and the risk of reproducing existing inequality 143 because
the effectiveness of algorithms and decision-making greatly relies on
what data is used and how. 144 Yet, Professor Bornstein believes that if
algorithms are handled properly, they can still “suppress, interrupt, or
remove protected class stereotypes from decisions.” 145
As noted earlier, my aim is not to adjudicate whether algorithms are
less biased than humans, 146 and I do not believe that such a determination
is necessary to observe the inadequacy of current laws to govern machine
learning algorithms or to conceive of better legal frameworks. Therefore,
although in many respects the algorithmic turn to hiring is purportedly
driven by a desire for fairness and efficiency—for example, Goldman
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, supra note 12.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521–23.
Id. at 523.
Id.
Id. at 570.
Id.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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Sachs’s hiring changes were prompted by a desire for a more diverse
candidate pool 147—as these machine learning algorithms may have the
(un)intended effects of perpetuating structural biases or could have a
disparate impact on protected categories, 148 the law should evolve more
robust governing mechanisms to guard against those outcomes. In the
next Section, I detail how bias may still creep into algorithmic decisionmaking systems in the context of recruitment and hiring.
B.

The Fault in the Machine

Albeit that it is well documented that humans evince bias in
employment decision-making, 149 one cannot overlook that algorithmic
systems of decision-making, too, might enable, facilitate, or amplify such
biases. The cases below demonstrate that this is true both in the
recruitment and hiring of job candidates. Consider also that it is exactly
because Facebook has automated algorithms that are able to distinguish
(with some degree of accuracy) between men and women that it is able to
select only men for job ads, and the inscrutable workings of this
algorithms also allows this discrimination to go undetected for some
time. It is impossible to do the same with an advertisement in a physical
newspaper. Thus, it is the very design of automated platform that is both
enabling and facilitating discrimination here. Therefore, this Article
builds on the work of Professor Olivier Sylvain, who has noted that the
design of automated intermediaries, has “enabled a range of harmful
expressive acts, including violations of housing and employment laws.” 150

See Thompson, supra note 113.
See Surden, supra note 49, at 88 (detailing gaps in the law in regards to machine learning
algorithms); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 3 (detailing issues of disparate impact associated with
algorithmic decision-making).
149 See infra Section III.A.
150 Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM.
U. (Apr. 1, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data [https://
perma.cc/5QXR-QFB9] [hereinafter Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data]; see also Olivier
Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203 (2018).
147
148
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A recent ProPublica investigation revealed that Facebook allowed
advertisers (both for jobs and for housing) to exclude audiences by ethnic
group. 151 In what investigators described as a modern form of Jim
Crow, 152 Facebook had developed a feature it termed “Ethnic
Affinities”—essentially, a method for advertisers to use demographic data
to algorithmically target who will receive certain Facebook ads. 153 For
example, one page on Facebook for Business, titled U.S. Hispanic Affinity
on Facebook, boasts of the potential for advertisers to reach up to 26.7
million Facebook users of “Hispanic Affinity.”154 From this specific ethnic
affinity, advertisers can choose to narrow in on bilingual users, those who
are “Spanish dominant,” or those who are “English dominant,” in order
to “refine [their] audience.” 155
Although, ostensibly, this algorithmic feature might help business
owners refine their audiences and target ads to individuals who might be
more likely customers, the use of Affinity Groups as an ad distribution
tool holds high potential for unlawful discrimination. In demonstration
of this discriminatory potential, ProPublica reporters were able to buy
dozens of rental house ads on Facebook that excluded “African
Americans, mothers of high school kids, people interested in wheelchair
ramps, Jews, expats from Argentina and Spanish speakers.”156
Following on the heels of this ProPublica investigation, a 2017 class
action lawsuit against Facebook contended that Facebook Business tools

151 Julia Angwin & Terry Parris Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 28, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-letsadvertisers-exclude-users-by-race [https://perma.cc/D3E8-5WVQ].
152 Id.
153 See About Reaching New Audiences, FACEBOOK FOR BUS., https://www.facebook.com/
business/help/717368264947302? helpref=page_content [https://perma.cc/ERU9-YB2N].
154 See U.S. Hispanic Affinity on Facebook, FACEBOOK FOR BUS., https://www.facebook.com/
business/a/us-hispanic-affinity-audience [https://web.archive.org/web/20190106063038/https://
www.facebook.com/business/a/us-hispanic-affinity-audience].
155 See id.
156 Jessica Guynn, Facebook Halts Ads that Exclude Racial and Ethnic Groups, USA TODAY (Nov.
29, 2017, 11:32 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/11/29/facebook-stop-allowingadvertisers-exclude-racial-and-ethnic-groups-targeting/905133001
[https://perma.cc/6QS5PA9Q].
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both “enable and encourage discrimination by excluding African
Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans—but not white Americans—
from receiving advertisements for the Relevant Opportunities.” 157 In an
amended complaint, another class action also alleged that “Facebook
offers a feature that is legally indistinguishable from word-of-mouth
hiring, which has long been considered a discriminatory and unlawful
employment practice.” 158 This allegation references Facebook’s
“Lookalike Audiences” feature, in which employers and employment
agencies provide a list of their existing workers to Facebook, and
Facebook uses that list to then create its own list of Facebook users who
are demographically similar to the existing workers. 159 Then, the
employer or employment agency uses the new “Lookalike Audience” list
created by Facebook as the population to receive its employment ads. 160
Such a feature would help to perpetuate any existing historical racial,
gender, and other demographic imbalances of employees already present
in a given corporation.
Seemingly in response to the publicity from the ProPublica
investigations, Facebook began temporarily blocking advertisers from
excluding audiences by race in late 2017. 161 In March of 2019, the
Communications Workers of America, along with the ACLU and the law
firm of Outten & Golden LLP, reached a settlement with Facebook in
which the corporation agreed to make “changes to its paid advertising
platform to prevent discrimination in employment, housing, and credit
advertising.” 162
157 First Amended Complaint at 1, Mobley v. Facebook, Inc., No. 16-cv-06440-EJD (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 13, 2017).
158 See First Amended Class and Collective Action Complaint at 22, Bradley v. T-Mobile U.S.,
Inc., No. 17-cv-07232-BLF (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2018), https://www.onlineagediscrimination.com/
sites/default/files/documents/og-cwa-complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/JGU8-DSKT].
159 See id.
160 See id.; see generally About Lookalike Audiences, FACEBOOK FOR BUS., https://
www.facebook.com/business/help/164749007013531 [https://perma.cc/4HXW-K5DM].
161 See Guynn, supra note 156.
162 CWA Secures Agreement with Facebook on Sweeping Reforms to Curb Discrimination, COMM.
WORKERS AM. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://cwa-union.org/news/cwa-secures-agreement-facebook-onsweeping-reforms-curb-discrimination [https://perma.cc/Q842-R5ZQ]. Here are some of the
reforms Facebook agreed to:

Create a separate portal for such ads with a much more limited set of targeting options
so that advertisers cannot target ads based on Facebook users’ age, gender, race, or
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Hiring

Job recruitment algorithms on platforms like Facebook are,
however, not the sole problem. Algorithms that quickly sort job
applicants based on pre-set criteria may also (inadvertently) be
unlawfully discriminatory. In her book, Weapons of Math Destruction,
Cathy O’Neil poignantly illustrates how personality tests may serve to
discriminate against one protected class, job applicants suffering from
mental disabilities. 163 In one class action, the named plaintiff, Kyle Behm,
a college student with a near-perfect SAT score and who had been
diagnosed with bipolar disorder, found himself repeatedly rejected for
minimum wage jobs at supermarkets and retail stores that all used a
personality test that had been modeled on the “Five Factor Model” test
used to diagnose mental illness. 164 Thus, personality tests, as part of
automated hiring systems, could be seen as a covert method for violating
antidiscrimination law—specifically, the Americans with Disabilities
Act. 165 In addition, other test questions, such as the length of commute
categories that are associated with membership in protected groups, or based on zip code
or a geographic area that is less than a 15-mile radius, and cannot consider users’ age,
gender, or zip code when creating “Lookalike” audiences for advertisers
Implement a system of automated and human review to catch advertisements that aren’t
correctly self-certified as these types of ads
Require all advertisers creating such ads to certify compliance with anti-discrimination
laws, and provide education for advertisers on those laws
Study the potential for unintended biases in algorithmic modeling on Facebook
Meet with plaintiffs and their counsel every six months for three years to enable them to
monitor the implementation of the reforms that Facebook is undertaking.
Press Release, Commc’ns Workers of Am., Facebook Agrees to Sweeping Reforms to Curb
Discriminatory Ad Targeting Practices (Mar. 19, 2019), https://cwa-union.org/news/releases/
facebook-agrees-sweeping-reforms-curb-discriminatory-ad-targeting-practices [https://perma.cc/
6L6X-UVBK].
163 O’NEIL, supra note 3.
164 Id.
165 Titles I and V of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117, 12201–12213 (2018)), grant mentally ill
workers equal opportunity in employment. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, Worker with Bipolar Disorder to Receive $91,000 in Disability Discrimination Case
Settled by EEOC (Mar. 18, 2003), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/3-18-03b.cfm
[https://perma.cc/94ZS-NBYW]; see also Depression, PTSD, & Other Mental Health Conditions in
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time, could be seen as covertly discriminating against those from underresourced neighborhoods which lack a reliable transportation
infrastructure. 166
In addition to personality tests, companies are using other
algorithmic processes to screen applicants. For example, the company
HireVue offers virtual interviews with individual applicants. HireVue’s
innovative hiring tool identifies facial expression, vocal indications, word
choice, and more. 167 The problem is that “[s]peech recognition software
can perform poorly” and “[f]acial analysis systems can struggle to read
the faces of women with darker skin.” 168 Some skeptics express their
concerns about the legitimacy of using physical features and facial
expressions that have no causal link with workplace success to make
hiring decisions. 169
Another example of automated hiring is the use of algorithms to
conduct social media background checks. Such checks are fraught with
issues for several reasons. First, they “presume that a person’s online
behaviors, like some use of foul language, are relevant to their
professional activities.” 170 Second, they have “limited ability to parse the
nuanced meaning of human communication.”171 In addition, such checks
could “surface details about an applicant’s race, sexual identity, disability,

the Workplace: Your Legal Rights, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/mental_health.cfm [https://perma.cc/5QDA-Y2HD].
166 Debra Cassens Weiss, Do Job Personality Tests Discriminate? EEOC Probes Lawyer’s
Complaint, Filed on Behalf of His Son, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 30, 2014, 8:08 AM), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/do_job_personality_tests_discriminate_eeoc_probes_lawyers_
complaint_filed_o [https://perma.cc/B3X3-YX9E].
167 Hilke Schellmann & Jason Bellini, Artificial Intelligence: The Robots Are Now Hiring, WALL
STREET J. (Sept. 20, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/artificial-intelligence-therobots-are-now-hiring-moving-upstream-1537435820 [https://perma.cc/4GHT-NTYB].
168 MIRANDA BOGEN & AARON RIEKE, UPTURN, HELP WANTED: AN EXAMINATION OF HIRING
ALGORITHMS, EQUITY, AND BIAS 37 (2018), https://www.upturn.org/reports/2018/hiringalgorithms [https://perma.cc/277F-ZG97]; see also Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender
Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC.
MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1 (2018).
169 See BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 168.
170 Id.
171 Id.
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pregnancy, or health status, which employers should not consider during
the hiring process.” 172
Finally, as the last step of the hiring process, employers make offers
to applicants using automated hiring systems. For example, there exist
software programs that predict the probability that a candidate will accept
a given job offer and that suggest what the employer could do to increase
those chances. For example, these programs allow the employer to “adjust
salary, bonus, stock options, and other benefits to see in real time how the
prediction changes.” 173 The worry remains that such programs might
amplify pay gaps for white women and racial minorities because the data
commonly include “ample proxies for a worker’s socioeconomic and
racial status, which could be reflected in salary requirement
predictions.”174 They might also undermine laws that bar employers from
considering candidates’ salary histories. 175
C.

Exposing the Mechanical Turk

Even as incidences of algorithmic bias come to light, 176 an important
feature of algorithms is that they tend to obscure the role of the human
hand in setting parameters for solving any given problem, with the final
Id.
Id. at 40.
174 See id. (internal footnote omitted).
175 See id.
176 It is important to note here, as I discuss more fully in another article, Ajunwa, supra note 91,
that U.S. law actively works to prevent instances of algorithmic bias from coming to light. One
reason is that the intellectual property law regime allows automated systems to fall under trade
secret or copyright law, which means that their creators are able to keep secret the exact workings
of these automated systems. Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in
1998. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in sections of 17 and 28
U.S.C.). Section 1201 of the DMCA creates liability for hacking or reverse engineering an
automated system protected under copyright law. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2018); see also Maayan Perel &
Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
473 (2016) (noting the chilling effect on researchers who would like to reverse engineer automated
processes, given the potential to incur liabilities). Another reason is that these systems also receive
intellectual property law protections without having demonstrated their utility to society. Cf.
Christopher Buccafusco, Mark A. Lemley & Jonathan S. Masur, Intelligent Design, 68 DUKE L.J. 75
(2018) (noting that designers are “able to obtain powerful IP protection over the utilitarian aspects
of their creations without demonstrating that they have made socially valuable contributions” and
concluding that “[t]his is bad for competition and bad for consumers”).
172
173
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result attributed solely to the machine. 177 Consider that proponents of
automations have always tended to downplay or deny the role of the
human mastermind. 178 As an early example, consider the “Mechanical
Turk” also known as the “chess Turk,” which was a chess-playing
machine constructed in the late eighteenth century. 179 Although the
Mechanical Turk was presented as an automaton chess-playing machine
that was capable of beating the best human players, the secret of the
machine was that it contained a human man, concealed inside its
chambers. 180 The hidden chess master controlled the machine while the
seemingly automated machine beat notable statesmen, like Napoleon
Bonaparte and Benjamin Franklin, at chess. 181 Thus, the Mechanical Turk
operated on obfuscation and subterfuge and sought to reserve the glory
of the win to the machine. 182
With the growing allure of AI as a venture-capital-generating
marketing ploy, 183 modern day corporations have been discovered
177 Surden, supra note 49, at 115; Jatinder Singh, Ian Walden, Jon Crowcroft & Jean Bacon,
Responsibility & Machine Learning: Part of a Process (Oct. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2860048 [https://perma.cc/6SLY-2QK9] (arguing that machines can
learn to operate in ways beyond their programming levels, meaning that the responsibility for
problems created by the algorithms cannot lie solely with the algorithms creators or the algorithms
themselves).
178 Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the
Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1207 (2017) (noting that machine-learning technology
is not yet fully understood and that most people simply “lack . . . [the] interpretive ability
to . . . show[] that X causes Y” on a machine-learning platform).
179 TOM STANDAGE, THE TURK: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE FAMOUS EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
CHESS-PLAYING MACHINE (2002).
180 4 RICKY JAY, The Automaton Chess Player, the Invisible Girl & the Telephone, in JAY’S
JOURNAL OF ANOMALIES 147, 147–62 (2000).
181 Id.
182 See PASQUALE, supra note 3 (arguing that algorithms operate on obfuscation). Conversely,
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk program does the opposite. The program allows businesses or
individual clients to assign human intelligence tasks, that is, tasks that are difficult or impossible
for machines to complete (like sorting photographs, writing product descriptions, completing
surveys, etc.) to humans. Amazon explicitly bans the use of automated bots to complete such tasks.
See AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com [https://perma.cc/6SHT-F88U].
183 See Ellen Huet, The Humans Hiding Behind the Chatbots, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 18, 2016, 8:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-18/the-humans-hiding-behind-thechatbots [https://perma.cc/GV6F-PZ28] (“The incentive to play up automation is high. Humanassisted AI is ‘the hottest space to be in right now,’ said Navid Hadzaad, who founded bot-andhuman concierge service GoButler. Startups in this arena have together raised at least $50 million
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operating their own versions of the Mechanical Turk. Consider, for
example, that the humans on the Amazon Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing work platform consider themselves the “AI behind the AI.”184
On this internet-based platform, human workers are recruited to
accomplish mundane tasks that are difficult for algorithms to tackle.
These tasks, referred to as “human intelligence tasks” (or HITs), include:
“transcribing audio clips; tagging photos with relevant keywords; copying
photocopied receipts into spreadsheets.” 185 While the work on Amazon
Turk and its notoriously low pay is no secret, a Bloomberg exposé
revealed that several corporations were disingenuously passing off the
labor of human workers as that of AI. 186
Even when corporations are not attempting to pass off human
workers as AI, it is important to understand that there is always a human
behind the AI. Modern day algorithms operate in ways similar to the
Mechanical Turk in that the human decisions behind the creation of
algorithms operated by businesses are generally considered trade secrets
that are jealously guarded and protected from government oversight.187
in venture capital funding in the past two years. But companies with a wide variety of strategies all
use similar and vague marketing language and don’t often divulge operational details.”). For
example, in May of 2018, to much publicity, Google debuted an uncanny digital assistant which is
able to call for reservations and fool humans on the telephone with its natural speech, complete
with human-like pauses and interjections. Chris Welch, Google Just Gave a Stunning Demo of
Assistant Making an Actual Phone Call, VERGE (May 8, 2018, 1:54 PM), https://www.theverge.com/
2018/5/8/17332070/google-assistant-makes-phone-call-demo-duplex-io-2018 [https://perma.cc/
UTD3-BWYU].
184 Miranda Katz, Amazon’s Turker Crowd Has Had Enough, WIRED (Aug. 23, 2017, 6:55 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/amazons-turker-crowd-has-had-enough [https://perma.cc/RJ6EK7B7].
185 Sarah O’Connor, My Battle to Prove I Write Better than an AI Robot Called ‘Emma,’ FIN.
TIMES (May 4, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/92583120-0ae0-11e6-b0f1-61f222853ff3
[https://perma.cc/U33Q-3F8T].
186 See Huet, supra note 183 (“A handful of companies employ humans pretending to be robots
pretending to be humans. In the past two years, companies offering do-anything concierges (Magic,
Facebook’s M, GoButler); shopping assistants (Operator, Mezi); and e-mail schedulers (X.ai, Clara)
have sprung up. The goal for most of these businesses is to require as few humans as possible. People
are expensive. They don’t scale. They need health insurance. But for now, the companies are largely
powered by people, clicking behind the curtain and making it look like magic.”).
187 See Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. ON TELECOMM . &
HIGH TECH. L. 235 (2011); supra note 176; see also Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 176 (noting the
chilling effect on researchers who would like to reverse engineer automated processes, given the
potential to incur liabilities).
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But while algorithms might remove some decisions from a human entity,
humans must still make the initial decisions as to what data to train the
algorithm on and as to what factors are deemed relevant or irrelevant. 188
Even more importantly, the decisions for what data is important in the
training data—decisions that are then matched as closely as possible by
the algorithm—are also made by humans. 189 For example, if a hiring
algorithm is trained on a corpus of resumes, a human must still make
consequential decisions as to what variables from the resumes should
matter and which ones should be disregarded by the algorithm. Thus,
akin to Mary Shelley’s conclusion in Frankenstein’s Monster, the creators
of runaway algorithms should not be permitted to disavow their
creations; rather those makers, like Dr. Frankenstein, must bear the
ultimate liability for any harm wrought by their creations.
III. EX MACHINA: A LEGAL PROBLEM, NOT A TECHNICAL PROBLEM
The framing of the problem of algorithmic bias becomes important
when deciding to whom to allocate liability. I contend that the current
framing of algorithmic bias as a technical problem rather than as a legal
problem is misguided. 190 As a consequence of this erroneous framing of
algorithmic bias as a solely technical problem, ineffective technosolutionist approaches have proliferated. I argue that a reframing of the
188 Even when automated feature selection methods are used, the final decision to use or not use
the results, as well as the choice of feature selection method and any fine-tuning of its parameters,
are choices made by humans. For more on feature selection see, e.g., GARETH JAMES, DANIELA
WITTEN, TREVOR HASTIE & ROBERT TIBSHIRANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL LEARNING
WITH APPLICATIONS IN R (2017).
189 See, e.g., the way that hiring startup Jobaline verifies their technique by using the ratings that
people listening give voice snippets of job candidates. Ying Li et al., Predicting Voice Elicited
Emotions, PROC. 21ST ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING
1969 (2015).
190 Professor Sandra Mayson also makes this argument in regard to algorithmic decisionmaking in the criminal justice field. Mayson, supra note 3 (arguing that the problem of disparate
impact in predictive risk algorithms lies not in the algorithmic system but in the nature of
prediction itself). Professors Paul Ohm and Blake Reid also make the argument that any coding
decision will necessarily demand a legal conclusion: “Given the intrinsic malleability of code, every
coding endeavor will implicate a growing number of regulations, subjecting coders to a complex
and entangled set of requirements, prohibitions, and obligations.” Paul Ohm & Blake Reid,
Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672 (2016).
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issues of bias in algorithmic hiring as legal in nature is necessary to plumb
the true depths of the problem. In the following Sections, I describe how
the biased results of algorithmic hiring systems are not merely technical
deficiencies, rather, they reveal legal anachronisms, such as an American
tradition of deference to the employer and what amounts to a legal shrug
when it comes to addressing the nebulous concept of “cultural fit” as
hiring criterion.
A.

A Legal Tradition of Employer Deference

As previous scholars have noted, the social phenomenon in which
organizations both respond to and construct the law that regulates them
“renders law ‘endogenous’; the content and meaning of law is determined
within the social field that it is designed to regulate.” 191 It is no surprise
then that American law has historically given much deference to
employers vis-à-vis the employment bargain. 192 In an empirical legal
study, Professors Clermont and Schwab found:

191 Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity of Legal
Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 407 (1999).
192 Perhaps the most emblematic example of the American legal system’s deference to employers
is the case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which held that any limit on the number of
hours (in excess of sixty hours) that employees of a bakery could work was unconstitutional.
Although that particular decision has since been overturned, there is a wealth of scholarship noting
the continued deference to employers. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor
Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1527 (2002) (noting that the “ossification of labor law” is due, in
part, to a lack of “democratic renewal”); see also Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating
Unconscious Discrimination: Firm-Based Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 347 (2008). Courts want to avoid turning Title VII into a rule by which employers could
be held liable for “perceived slights” towards employees. Id.; see also Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart
J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 429 (2004) (claiming that employment discrimination plaintiffs (unlike many other
plaintiffs) have always done substantially worse in judge trials than in jury trials); Michael J.
Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?,
53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1944 (2004) (“The 5.8 percent reversal rate of defendant trial victories is smaller
in employment discrimination cases than any other category of cases except prisoner habeas corpus
trials.”); see also Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (looking at reported decisions from 1992–1998 and finding
that defendants prevailed in more than ninety-three percent of the cases decided at the trial court
level and were more likely to be affirmed on appeal); Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and
Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1577 (1989) (noting that only
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Employment discrimination plaintiffs . . . . manage many fewer
happy resolutions early in litigation, and so they have to proceed
toward trial more often. They win a lower proportion of cases
during pretrial and at trial. Then, more of their successful cases
are appealed. On appeal, they have a harder time upholding
their successes and reversing adverse outcomes. 193
Likewise, after Professor Wendy Parker’s empirical study of 659
cases alleging racial discrimination in employment, she concluded that
judges operate under the assumption that those types of claims are
generally without merit. 194 For cases alleging implicit bias, Professor
Franita Tolson has also noted that courts will find in favor of the
employee in only the most extreme cases because the courts have
“statutory concerns and . . . [believe] that they are not qualified to resolve
these claims.” 195
Professor Selmi echoes these conclusions and observes:
When it comes to race cases, which are generally the most
difficult claim for a plaintiff to succeed on, courts often seem
mired in a belief that the claims are generally unmeritorious,
brought by whining plaintiffs who have been given too many,
not too few, breaks along the way. These biases, as well as others,
inevitably influence courts’ treatment of discrimination cases,
and help explain why the cases are so difficult to win. 196
Professor Selmi also notes that judges display a similar bias against
employees in sex employment discrimination cases as judicial activism
has created an affirmative defense for employers “out of whole cloth, as
there was very little precedent for the defense . . . . [and] may signal a shift
in judicial attitudes that portends more difficulty for plaintiffs to recover
in cases of sexual harassment . . . .”197
claims filed by prisoners have a lower success rate than that of employment discrimination
plaintiffs).
193 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 192.
194 Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 889, 893 (2006).
195 See Tolson, supra note 192, at 378.
196 Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV.
555, 556–57 (2001).
197 Id. at 569.
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In addition to this legal deference in contested cases of employment
discrimination, employers exercise a great deal of latitude in choosing
which job applicants they hire and fire. 198 This is especially true of at-will
jurisdictions, where employees can be hired and fired based on a vast list
of criteria determined by the employer. 199 In her article, Discrimination
at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment Opportunity in
Conflict, 200 Professor Julie Suk notes that employment discrimination
scholars have argued that “employment at will seriously undermines the
effectiveness of employment discrimination law in bringing about race
and gender equality in the workplace.” 201 Other legal scholars have
articulated exactly why this is the case as they note that the job protections
present in antidiscrimination law might dissuade employers from hiring
job applicants from protected groups. In her book, Working Together, 202
Professor Estlund argues that employers have perverse disincentives to
hire racial minorities when Title VII operates in the context of
employment at will 203 because of the risk of incurring expenses in a Title
VII suit. As Professors Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman put it, “protection
against discriminatory firing acts as a kind of tax on hiring those to whom
it is extended.”204 Furthermore, employment at-will as a norm “affects the
burdens of production and proof under the McDonnell Douglas
framework when individual Title VII cases are litigated, often to the
detriment of plaintiffs.” 205
198 Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers,
3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65 (2000).
199 “The rule of employment at will allows either the employer or the employee to terminate the
employment relationship at any time for good reason, bad reason, or no reason.” Julie C. Suk,
Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60
STAN. L. REV. 73, 78 (2007). At-will employment is the law in every U.S. state except for Montana.
See At-Will Employment—Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 15, 2008), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx
[https://
perma.cc/Y47U-64EN].
200 Suk, supra note 199.
201 Id. at 81.
202 CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003).
203 Suk, supra note 199, at 83; see ESTLUND, supra note 202, at 152.
204 Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability
Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1489 (1996).
205 Suk, supra note 199, at 81.
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The Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in St. Mary’s Honor Center v.
Hicks illustrates the detriments of the employment-at-will standard to
employment discrimination plaintiffs. 206 The plaintiff, Hicks, a black
correctional officer, experienced repeated and severe disciplinary actions
at the hands of a new supervisor. 207 Hicks was eventually fired. 208 Hicks
then filed a Title VII case and presented a prima facie case under the
standards of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 209 Although the district
court found that the defendant offered false nondiscriminatory reasons
for the firing, the district court nonetheless found for the defendant
because the plaintiff had not proven that the employer’s actions were
“racially rather than personally motivated.” 210
Amidst the legal backdrop of employer discretion and deference, the
use of algorithmic hiring systems can exacerbate, rather than ameliorate,
issues of bias, particularly given the well documented technological
capability for those types of hiring systems to substitute facially neutral
variables as proxies for protected demographic characteristics such as
race and gender. 211 The nature of the hiring relationship can be explained
succinctly by the following quote: “typically the matching of a worker to
a position does not reflect the outcome of the worker picking from among
several job offers. Rather, it is the result of an employer picking from
among several applicants.” 212 Employers choose candidates and not the
other way around. Today, with the growing expanse of online job
applications, job seekers apply to an average of twenty-seven jobs before
they attain one interview. 213 Of course, since only seventeen percent of
interviews actually result in an offer of employment, it is likely that these
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993).
Id. at 505.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 505–06. Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a plaintiff could
establish a prima facie case without direct evidence by proving (1) that he was a member of a
protected group, (2) that he was qualified for the job, (3) he applied for the job and was rejected,
and (4) the job continued to remain open. Id. at 802.
210 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 508
211 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 3, at 692–93.
212 John M. Barron, John Bishop & William C. Dunkelberg, Employer Search: The Interviewing
and Hiring of New Employees, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 43, 43 (1985).
213 Matthew Nitch Smith, You Now Have to Apply for 27 Jobs Just to Get 1 Interview, BUS.
INSIDER (May 16, 2016, 5:51 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/job-seekers-have-to-apply-for27-jobs-for-every-interview-survey-finds [https://perma.cc/X34D-HBRH].
206
207

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

1712

[Vol. 41:1671

applicants apply to far more than twenty-seven jobs throughout their
entire job search. 214 In one extreme case, an applicant even built his own
algorithm to apply to thousands of jobs at once, in an attempt to “beat”
being sorted out by automated hiring platforms. 215
On the employer’s side of this surge in applications, on average, fiftynine people apply for each open position. 216 From this pool of applicants,
then, the employer is required to eliminate a large number of candidates
in order to find candidates to interview—and ultimately hire. Due to the
large pool of applicants, though, an average of only twelve percent of
applicants will be interviewed for any open position. 217 This indicates that
employers must use the information available to them to eliminate a large
number of applicants before they can make substantial progress in
finding the most talented candidates. The sheer necessity for this culling
of possible job applicants has left some scholars in support of the
employers’ total discretion in the hiring process. 218 Yet, it is undeniable
that granting such near-total discretion opens the door for human bias to
be introduced into the employment decision-making process. The
subsequent use of algorithmic systems only allows said bias to become
entrenched and more difficult to detect.
B.

The Problem of “Cultural Fit”

Given the wide discretion that employers enjoy, an insidious
manner in which bias may infiltrate the employment decision-making
process is through the discernment of “cultural fit,” as, in many ways, the
variables employed to algorithmically cull resumes are approximations of
“cultural fit.” The problem is that some of those variables may be
inherently at odds with Title VII, while allowing employers to avoid
hiring protected classes of applicants, “as long as some credible
214 Martha C. White, Here’s How Long It Really Takes to Get a Job, MONEY (Oct. 22, 2015),
http://time.com/money/4053899/how-long-it-takes-to-get-hired [https://perma.cc/L5J2-WMEN].
215 Robert Coombs, I Built a Bot to Apply to Thousands of Jobs at Once—Here’s What I Learned,
FAST CO. (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3069166/i-built-a-bot-to-apply-tothousands-of-jobs-at-once-heres-what-i-learned [https://perma.cc/Q47L-8KQC].
216 White, supra note 214.
217 Id.
218 See, e.g., Peter Cappelli, Career Jobs Are Dead, 42 CAL. MGMT. REV. 146 (1999).
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nondiscriminatory reason . . . can be presented.” 219 This issue is
exacerbated by machine learning algorithms that may not treat “cultural
fit” as the amorphous concept that it is but rather as a strict rule, thus
creating the genre of scenarios I detailed before wherein a hiring
algorithm or algorithms might deduce that only men named “Jared” and
who play lacrosse are “fit” for the job. 220
To achieve culling, employers study a number of qualities about
candidates—from their resumes, to their past employment experiences,
and their “cultural fit” within the perspective company. 221 Cultural fit is
defined as “the likelihood that a job candidate will be able to conform and
adapt to the core values and collective behaviors that make up an
organization.” 222 For example, “60% of recruiters rate culture fit of
highest importance when making a hiring decision.” 223 This shows that
recruiters considered cultural fit as more significant than cover letters
(26%), prestige of college (21%), and GPA (19%). Cultural fit of a
candidate is topped only by previous job experience (67%). 224 When
judging whether a candidate is a cultural fit, eighty-three percent of
recruiters consider communication style most important.
While scholars largely agree about the need for resumes and
descriptions of past experiences, many are at odds with the idea of an
employer’s determination of an applicant’s cultural fit. 225 In many
regards, the determination of a candidate’s cultural fit is subjective. Some
articles report that assessing cultural fit comes down to an employer’s
Suk, supra note 199, at 73.
See Gershgorn, supra note 92.
221 See Laura Morgan Roberts & Darryl D. Roberts, Testing the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law:
The Business, Legal, and Ethical Ramifications of Cultural Profiling at Work, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL’Y 369 (2007).
222 Margaret
Rouse,
What
Is
Cultural
Fit?,
TECHTARGET:
SEARCHCIO,
https://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/Cultural-fit [https://perma.cc/T3UH-CQAZ] (last
updated Sept. 2014).
223 JOBVITE, JOBVITE RECRUITER NATION REPORT 2016: THE ANNUAL RECRUITING SURVEY
(2016), https://www.jobvite.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/RecruiterNation2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KSC4-PV3Q].
224 See id.
225 See, e.g., Christine Sgarlata Chung, From Lily Bart to the Boom-Boom Room: How Wall
Street’s Social and Cultural Response to Women Has Shaped Securities Regulation, 33 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 175 (2010) (arguing that cultural fit within the finance industry is imperfect, as bias has
been historically ingrained).
219
220
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“gut feeling.”226 Others have reported that a candidate might be a good fit
if “[t]hey work well with others”—which seems to be something that is
difficult to predict without ever seeing a candidate work with other
people. 227 To this end, some researchers have promoted the idea that
corporate culture can be learned, indeed, because nearly every company
that hires a new employee has a period of “socialization” or social
training. 228 Others have shown that interviewers are not even significantly
adept at assessing applicants’ personal characteristics from interviews. 229
On the other hand, researchers have argued that assessing cultural
fit is important because “employee alignment to company culture
influences worker satisfaction, engagement and retention,” which can
ultimately help the corporation to succeed. 230 Furthermore, a study of
thirty-eight interviewers who were in the process of making hiring
decisions found that interviewers can actually assess cultural fit “with
significant degrees of accuracy” and that this factor is often “the best
predictor[] of hiring recommendations.” 231 Given both arguments, it is
clear that there can be both positive and negative implications of trying
to assess a candidate’s cultural fit—but cultural fit can only be a useful
criterion for hiring so long as an employer could make an accurate
determination of such fit.
The problem there is that, as employment law scholars such as
Professor Natasha Martin have noted, “workplace decision-makers may
gain awareness of the lack of cultural fit only after some time has

226 Lauren Brown, ‘Gut Feeling’ Still the Most Common Deciding Factor in Hiring, Survey Shows,
PEOPLE MGMT. (July 11, 2018), https://www.peoplemanagement.co.uk/news/articles/gut-feelingmost-common-deciding-factor-in-hiring-survey-shows [https://perma.cc/DZV4-SYEC].
227 Jeff Pruitt, 3 Ways to Know if an Employee Is a Culture Fit, INC. (Aug. 12, 2016),
https://www.inc.com/jeff-pruitt/3-ways-to-know-if-an-employee-is-a-culture-fit.html
[https://perma.cc/9BEC-JCBH].
228 Richard Pascale, The Paradox of “Corporate Culture”: Reconciling Ourselves to Socialization,
27 CAL. MGMT. REV. 26 (1985).
229 Richard D. Arvey & James E. Campion, The Employment Interview: A Summary and Review
of Recent Research, 35 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 281 (1982).
230 Lauren Dixon, The Pros and Cons of Hiring for ‘Cultural Fit,’ CHIEF LEARNING OFFICER:
TALENT ECON. (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.chieflearningofficer.com/2017/12/06/pros-cons-hiringcultural-fit [https://perma.cc/NWW2-8TQE].
231 Daniel M. Cable & Timothy A. Judge, Interviewers’ Perceptions of Person-Organization Fit
and Organizational Selection Decisions, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 546, 558 (1997).
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passed.” 232 This means that even if an individual is hired, it is likely that
the decision-maker’s view of the worker changes over time with greater
exposure. 233 Professor Martin notes that “[t]his social construction of
identity bears on selection of individuals when organizations make
decisions based on cultural fit. By aligning employees with environmental
factors, employers focus less on the candidate’s skill set, and more on the
intangibles that make uncovering discriminatory motive more
difficult.” 234 For instance, cultural fit qualifications, such as “relish
change,” “possess passion for exceptional quality,” “confront risks,” or
“think creatively,” have an “amorphous quality because they are
generalized and undefined with respect to any particular job task or
role.” 235 Therefore, the ultimate decisions can rest merely on gut feelings
like “I just like that candidate” or “he just feels right.” 236 Even though
choosing an individual based on seemingly aligned values may look like
a good business decision, the problem with cultural fit in the selection
process lies in the “imperceptibility of such characteristics, and the
conscious and unconscious layering of meaning on such abstract terms
by the decision-maker.” 237 Professor Martin cites to Professor Charles
Lawrence’s law review article, 238 in which he observes that “where an
‘employer perceives the white candidate as “more articulate,” “more
collegial,” “more thoughtful,” or “more charismatic[,]” [h]e is unaware of
the learned stereotype that influenced his decision.’” 239
In sum, the problem with cultural fit is about the “perception of who
belongs.” 240 Employers try to select candidates who match their
“culturally consistent selection criteria,” and in the fast-paced workplace,
an employer has to make decisions with incomplete information about
each candidate and hire an individual who seems to be a “good fit based
232 Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination
in the Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1117, 1156 (2008).
233 See id.
234 Id. at 1158.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 1159.
238 Id. (alteration in original) (citing Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987)).
239 Id.; Lawrence, supra note 238, at 343.
240 Martin, supra note 232, at 1159.
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on paper credentials and limited staged interview interaction.” 241 Later,
the same employee “might be deemed unfit in cultural terms . . . because
he failed to attune to the organization’s culture.” 242 In this situation,
“[p]eople of color and other workplace minorities are often encouraged
to assimilate, mask their true identity or ethnic salience, for example, to
adapt to an organization’s culture.” 243 Citing to the work of Professors
Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, 244 Martin explains that “[a]s long as the
worker’s difference is innocuous and unobtrusive, then the worker
benefits from efforts to belong” and “once the employee fails to
sufficiently cover, he may be deemed inconsistent with the organization
and no longer befitting of inclusion.”245 Professors Carbado and Gulati
have also argued that the “extra” identity work that women and
minorities are forced to do to conform to workplace perceptions of
“cultural fit” is a form of employment discrimination. 246
Courts, however, have consistently sided with defendants in
contestations of cultural fit as a criterion for hiring and firing. One
notorious case is Natay v. Murray School District, 247 in which the courts
sided with the employer when deciding the cultural fit of an employee.
The plaintiff, hired by the school district as a provisional teacher, was the
only Native American in the group of forty-seven recently hired
provisional teachers and on the school faculty. 248 Plaintiff described her
treatment at the school as discriminatory from the start; the principal
snubbed her at the first staff meeting, disciplined her but not another
teacher, and came late to her scheduled evaluations. In addition, the
principal told Natay at one point that she was “geographically, racially,
culturally, and socially out of place” at the school, and her contract was
not renewed after unfavorable evaluations. 249 The school district
superintendent also decided that the plaintiff was “not an excellent
Id.
Id.
243 Id.
244 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1262
(2000); Devon W. Carbado, Racial Naturalization, 57 AM. Q. 633, 655 (2005).
245 Martin, supra note 232, at 1160.
246 See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 244, at 1262.
247 Natay v. Murray Sch. Dist., 119 F. App’x 259 (10th Cir. 2005).
248 See id. at 260.
249 See id.
241
242
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teacher and not someone [he] would want Murray School District to hire
on a long-term basis.” 250 Natay had an informal conference with the
superintendent, but her arguments did not change the decision. Of the
district’s provisional teachers hired for that school year, only Natay’s
contract was not renewed, and on her last day of work, the principal made
another racially derogatory comment to her. 251 Natay brought a
discriminatory discharge claim in federal district court, and the court
entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. She appealed.
In the Tenth Circuit, the court reviewed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, using the same standards, as well as the evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. It stated that although
the plaintiff proved that the principal showed discriminatory actions, she
lacked evidence showing that the superintendent, the ultimate decisionmaker, had a discriminatory reason not to renew her contract.252 Based
on the “cat’s paw” doctrine, she did not prove that the “manager who
discharged the plaintiff merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’
for a subordinate employee’s prejudice,” 253 regardless of the manager’s
discriminatory intent. Also, the court used the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework. The court decided that the plaintiff satisfied
the prima facie case and succeeded in shifting the burden to the school
district. Although the plaintiff claimed that the superintendent’s
investigation of her performance was inadequate because he never sat in
her classroom to observe her, the court stood on the side of the
superintendent, whose affidavit detailed other steps in his investigation
and decision to not renew the contract due to her ineffectiveness. Thus,
the court concluded that the plaintiff’s showing did not reasonably give
rise to an inference that the employer’s reasons were pretextual and
affirmed the decision of the district court. 254

250
251
252
253
254

Id. at 261.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 262.
Id.
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Re-Thinking Employer Discretion

Given that deference to an employer’s determination of cultural fit
may not bode well for members of protected groups, as an ex ante
approach to curbing algorithmic discrimination in hiring, I argue for a
rethinking of employer discretion, particularly regarding variables meant
to indicate “cultural fit” as part of algorithmic hiring. I propose that the
law should mandate that the criteria used in algorithmic hiring must have
some probative value for determining fitness to perform required job
duties. This proposal is supported by new studies that show that “cultural
fitness” is not always necessary for long-term success at a firm. One such
study conducted by business professors at Stanford and Berkeley found
that the capacity to change and flexibility—that is, high
“enculturability”—were more important than pre-existing cultural fit in
regard to long-term success. 255 According to the authors of the study:
Our results suggest that firms should place less emphasis on
screen for cultural fit, . . . . [a]s other work has shown, matching
on cultural fit often favors applicants from particular
socioeconomic backgrounds, leading to a reduction in
workplace diversity. Instead, our work points to the value of
screening on enculturability. 256
The study concludes with three enculturability questions that
employers might pose to potential candidates during the hiring process:
“1. To what extent do candidates seek out diverse cultural environments?
2. How rapidly do they adjust to these new environments? 3. How do they
balance adapting to the new culture while staying true to themselves?” 257
As a result of such new studies, more companies are moving away
from “cultural fit” as a factor for hiring. For example, in a bid to create a
more inclusive hiring process, Facebook outlawed the term “culture fit”
255 Amir Goldberg, Sameer B. Srivastava, V. Govind Manian, William Monroe & Christopher
Potts, Fitting In or Standing Out? The Tradeoffs of Structural and Cultural Embeddedness, 81 AM.
SOC. REV. 1190 (2016).
256 Rich Lyons, Lose Those Cultural Fit Tests: Instead Screen New Hires for ‘Enculturability,’
FORBES (June 7, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richlyons/2017/06/07/lose-thosecultural-fit-tests-instead-screen-new-hires-for-enculturability/#450b9e6b63a8 [https://perma.cc/
5EYT-KF36].
257 Id.
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as interview feedback, “requiring interviewers to provide specific
feedback that supported their position.”258 Facebook also took steps to
“proactively identify unconscious bias” in their interview process and
“developed a ‘managing unconscious bias’ training program.” 259
Other companies now embrace “hiring for values fit” as a method to
decrease unconscious bias in interviewing. For example, Atlassian, an
Australia-based company, redesigned its interview process: “values fit
interviewers are carefully selected and given training on topics like
structured interviewing and unconscious bias.” 260 The interview is
structured with a set of behavioral questions to assess whether a candidate
would thrive in an environment with their company values. 261 As one of
Atlassian’s chief officers explains: “Focusing on ‘values fit’ ensures we hire
people who share our sense of purpose and guiding principles, while
actively looking for those with diverse viewpoints, backgrounds, and skill
sets. We’re trying to build a healthy and balanced culture, not a cult.”262
This approach has borne positive results for Atlassian. In 2015, ten
percent of their technical workforce identified as female. In 2016,
seventeen percent of recent hires were women, and women held fourteen
percent of all technical roles. Similarly, in 2015, their U.S.-based team had
twenty-three percent of employees identifying as people of color. In 2016,
people of color comprised thirty-two percent of their new hires. 263
IV. EX LEGIS: NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
In this Part, I discuss potential new legal frameworks that could
address bias in automated hiring platforms. An open legal issue is who
258 Lars
Schmidt, The End of Culture Fit, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2017, 7:50 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/larsschmidt/2017/03/21/the-end-of-culture-fit/#70fbdb72638a
[https://perma.cc/N7H3-SNZS].
259 Id.; Sheryl Sandberg, Managing Unconscious Bias, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (July 28, 2015),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/07/managing-unconscious-bias [https://perma.cc/A2KGH5AZ].
260 Schmidt, supra note 258.
261 Id. A description of Atlassian’s company values is available here: Company Values,
ATLASSIAN, https://www.atlassian.com/company/values [https://perma.cc/WS37-QL4Q].
262 Schmidt, supra note 258.
263 Id. Atlassian diversity hire figures are public available here: Building Equitable, Balanced
Teams and a Sense of Belonging, ATLASSIAN, https://www.atlassian.com/belonging
[https://perma.cc/3949-T3ZN].
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should bear the legal liability for when an automated hiring algorithm is
returning biased results. Is it the business firm that is using the algorithms
for its hiring process? Or is it the maker of the algorithmic hiring
platform? In this Part, I approach the issue of liability from different
vantages: A) from the position of holding accountable the maker of the
algorithmic hiring system; B) from the position of holding the employer
accountable; and C) from the position of holding liable both the maker of
the algorithmic system and, potentially, also the employer.
A.

Improving on the Fiduciary Duty Concept

Even if it is accepted that employers owe no duties to job applicants,
some legal scholars would argue that the makers of hiring platforms
should owe a legal duty to job applicants. 264 Professor Jack Balkin
characterizes information fiduciaries as entities “who, because of their
relationship with another, [assume] special duties with respect to the
information they obtain in the course of the relationship.” 265 According
264 See, e.g., Ford, supra note 30 (arguing that employment law imposes a duty of care on
employers to avoid decisions that undermine social equality).
265 Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1183 (2016) [hereinafter Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment]; The phrase
“information fiduciaries” was first coined by Professor Kenneth Laudon. See Kenneth C. Laudon,
Markets and Privacy, ICIS 1993 PROC. 65, 70–71 (1993) (proposing a “National Information
Market” within which “information fiduciaries . . . would accept deposits of information from
depositors and seek to maximize the return on sales of that information in national markets or
elsewhere in return for a fee”). Professor Jack Balkin popularized the term in several writings. See
Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 5, 2014),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age.html
[https://perma.cc/AL58-WWLT]; Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data,
Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1160–63
(2018); Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2047–55 (2018); JACK
M. BALKIN, HOOVER INST., FIXING SOCIAL MEDIA’S GRAND BARGAIN 11–15 (2018),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RN22-4D86]. Professor Jonathan Zittrain has also made important theoretical
contributions to the concept of information fiduciaries. See Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A
Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346
[https://perma.cc/P436-G96Z]; Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without
Anyone Ever Finding Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117878/
information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering
[https://perma.cc/935CQGWN]; Jonathan Zittrain, How to Exercise the Power You Didn’t Ask For, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.
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to Professor Balkin, the relationship between the consumer and job
applicant is analogous to that between a doctor and patient. 266 Thus, an
information fiduciaries “have special duties to act in ways that do not
harm the interests of the people whose information they collect, analyze,
use, sell, and distribute.” 267 In the context of employment, the primary
question is: How should the law conceptualize the responsibilities of these
hiring platforms in regard to the information they solicit and transmit?
I depart from Professor Balkin’s analogy, 268 to offer a more critical
view of the relationship between job seekers and the automated hiring
platform as brokering intermediary. My theorizing responds directly to
trenchant critiques of the information fiduciary idea. Notably, Professors
Lina Khan and David Pozen have expressed doubts in their essay, A
Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 269 as to “whether the concept
of information fiduciaries is an adequate or apt response to the problems
of information asymmetry and abuse” of platforms and whether such a
theory ignores “fundamental problems associated with market
dominance and with business models that demand pervasive
surveillance.”270 The authors also conclude that the information-fiduciary
framework “invites an enervating complacency about issues of structural
power and a premature abandonment of more robust visions of public
regulation.” 271
My aim in this Article is not to adjudicate whether the concept of
information fiduciaries can comprehensively offer the solution to
problems associated with online platforms. 272 I do, however, find the
19,
2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercise-the-power-you-didnt-ask-for
[https://perma.cc/K3TV-KMLP]; Jonathan Zittrain, Mark Zuckerberg Can Still Fix This Mess, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/07/opinion/sunday/zuckerbergfacebook-privacy-congress.html [https://perma.cc/AVM9-AETF].
266 Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, supra note 265, at 1205–09.
267 Id. at 1209.
268 Id. at 1205–09.
269 Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L.
REV. 497 (2019).
270 See id. at 501.
271 See id. at 502.
272 Cf. James Grimmelmann, When All You Have Is a Fiduciary, LAW & POL. ECON. (May 30,
2019), https://lpeblog.org/2019/05/30/when-all-you-have-is-a-fiduciary [https://perma.cc/753RCVLD] (suggesting that while fiduciary principles are ill-suited to problems of self-dealing, content
moderation, and market concentration on online platforms, the “best version” of U.S. information
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concept useful in discussing problems associated with one particular type
of online platform, and that is the automated hiring platform. And as the
rest of my Article demonstrates, I consider the idea of the information
fiduciary as an important building block towards other theorization
regarding online platforms, and also as one of several potential checks to
the currently unbridled power of automated hiring platforms to serve
exclusionary ends. I believe that there could be a multiplicity of
approaches to the governance of online platforms for the betterment of
society. For example, while hitherto I have tended to focus on
governmental action as the appropriate governance mechanism for
algorithmic bias, other legal scholars, like Professor Sonia Katyal, have
called for private accountability measures. 273 No one scholar can claim
the cure-all solution to the problem of algorithmic bias, but rather than
reject proposed solutions outright as nostrum, we should acknowledge
that we are all blind men grasping at the elephant and that our collective
intellectual attempts may yet reveal a full view of the problem at hand. As
such, several legal scholars have recently called for the extension of
fiduciary duties to other areas of law. 274 And some legal scholars have also
argued against the expansion of fiduciary duties. 275 I argue that
established concepts from organizational theory scholarship further
bolster the argument that hiring platforms are performing a brokerage
function and thus should be considered fiduciaries. 276
privacy law “would cash out fiduciary principles in specifying when and how platforms can use and
share user data”).
273 Katyal, supra note 16 (calling for a variety of tools to tackle algorithmic accountability such
as codes of conduct, impact statements, and whistleblower protection).
274 See D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013); see also D.
Theodore Rave, Fiduciary Voters?, 66 DUKE L.J. 331 (2016); cf. Seth Davis, The False Promise of
Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145 (2014).
275 See James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 904 (2014) (“[W]e are
undergoing something of an academic fiduciary renaissance, with scholars arguing for treating
legislators, judges, jurors, and even friends as fiduciaries.” (internal footnotes omitted)); Daniel
Yeager, Fiduciary-isms: A Study of Academic Influence on the Expansion of the Law, 65 DRAKE L.
REV. 179, 184 (2017) (arguing that “academic writing, deploying a sense of fiduciary so open as to
be empty, has influenced courts to designate” more entities as fiduciaries).
276 I take as authority the definition of brokerage set forth by Marsden: Brokerage is understood
as a mechanism by which “actors facilitate transactions between other actors lacking access to or
trust in one another . . . .” See Peter V. Marsden, Brokerage Behavior in Restricted Exchange
Networks, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND NETWORK ANALYSIS 201–02 (Peter V. Marsden & Nan Lin
eds., 1982).
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My theorizing then works to clarify both the power and information
asymmetry relationships present in the triad of job applicant, hiring
platform, and employer. For example, with platform authoritarianism, I
make clear the unequal power relationship between the job applicant and
the platform, which allows the platform to dictate in what manner the job
applicant may make use of the platform thus belying the caretaking
imagery conjured by a doctor-patient analogy. With the tertius bifrons
concept, I reveal the duplicitous relationship between the hiring platform
and the job applicant, which then supports the argument for greater
employment discrimination liability for the platform.
1.

Platform Authoritarianism

As Professor Olivier Sylvain has noted, platforms “shape the form
and substance of their users’ content.”277 Furthermore, platforms also
shape relationships as they connect users to one another while also
enjoying “a great deal of control over how users’ encounters are
structured.” 278 In evaluating certain design policy choices that these
companies make, such as the methods through which they facilitate the
amount of information users can learn about one another and how they
are to do so, one argument is that online platforms can make choices that
exacerbate the discrimination in our current society. 279 Thus, makers of
platforms cannot be blameless for the discrimination that occurs on
them—even if their users may be influenced by pre-existing biases. 280
Thus, I theorize “platform authoritarianism” as a sociotechnical
phenomenon that has transformed the responsibility and liability of
platforms. 281
Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, supra note 150.
Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing Against Discrimination in Online Markets, 32
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1183, 1183 (2017).
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Facebook Users Aren’t the Reason Facebook Is in Trouble Now, WASH. POST
(Mar. 23, 2018, 11:12 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/03/
23/facebook-users-arent-the-reason-facebook-is-in-trouble-now
[https://perma.cc/8GXHUYFQ]. Professor Shoshana Zuboff was one of the first to detail how platforms could be deployed
in the surveillance and managerial control of employees. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF
THE SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER (1988); see also SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE
277
278
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Platform authoritarianism is what I term our present social position
vis-à-vis platforms, wherein creators of platforms demand that we engage
with those platforms solely “on their dictated terms, without regard for
established laws and business ethics.” 282 Some scholars have noted that
many online platforms can control “who is matched with whom for
various forms of exchange, what information users have about one
another during their interactions, and how indicators of reliability and
reputation are made salient.” 283 This means that for example, job
applicants on hiring platforms must acquiesce to data demands from the
platforms; they are also not in control of how their candidacy is
presented, but rather must relinquish all control to the platform as quid
pro quo for accessing job opportunity. Rejecting platform
authoritarianism in favor of a duty of care that the purveyors of online
platforms owe to their users is the first step towards returning to a rule of
law for algorithms.
2.

The Tertius Bifrons

While exercising authoritative control over the content and
structure of their users’ interactions, hiring platforms also hide their true
relationship to job applicants and this deception can lull applicants into
a false sense of trust. According to the sociologist Georg Simmel, brokers,
as part of a triad, perform the function of brokering information between
two separate groups, acting as either tertius iungens or tertius gaudens. 284
The tertius iungens (“the third who joins”) orientation is derived from the
Latin verb “iungere,” which means to join, unite, or connect. 285 The
emphasis of this orientation is on the joining of two parties. Thus, a tertius
iungens broker will operate with a strategic emphasis on creating
friendship and collaboration between two parties. 286 For example, linking
AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF
POWER (2019).
282 Ajunwa, supra note 281.
283 Levy & Barocas, supra note 278, at 1183.
284 SIMMEL, supra note 33.
285 David Obstfeld, Social Networks, the Tertius Iungens Orientation, and Involvement in
Innovation, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 100, 102 (2005).
286 Id.
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disparate parties in one’s social network in order to create outcomes that
are mutually beneficial for two or more parties. 287 In contrast, the tertius
gaudens (“the third who enjoys”) orientation emphasizes the strategic
separation of parties. 288 In this sense, a broker would enjoy the benefit of
the continued separation between two parties for the broker’s own
gain. 289
Going beyond the two categories of brokerage, organizational
theory scholars have noted that brokers may engage in four different
brokering strategies. Brokers may:
(1) coordinate action or information between distant parties
who have no immediate prospect for direct introduction or
connection, (2) actively maintain and exploit the separation
between parties, (3) introduce or facilitate preexisting ties
between parties such that the coordinative role of the tertius
iungens subsequently recedes in importance (brief iungens), and
(4) introduce or facilitate interaction between parties while
maintaining an essential coordinative role over time. 290
The automated hiring process comprises a triad, with the automated
hiring platform as the broker negotiating between the applicant and the
employer. I argue that, in this triad, hiring platforms are brokers who
perform an “essential coordinative role over time” 291 by continuously
parsing resumes received from job applicants before delivering them to
employers. Furthermore, I propose that automated hiring platforms,
which can be customized at the request of the employer (but not that of
the applicant) belong to a new category of brokers that I term “the tertius
bifrons” (that is, “the two-faced third”). With the introduction of this new
term, I am arguing that automated hiring platforms represent a type of
broker which works both in its own interest (to maintain its coordinative
role) and in the interest of one of the parties to the triad (the employer),

Id.
Id.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 104.
291 David Obstfeld, Social Networks, the Tertius Iungens Orientation, and Involvement in
Innovation, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 100, 104 (2005).
287
288
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while maintaining the appearance of working for both parties (employer
and job applicant).
This categorization rings true in light of the class action allegations
against Facebook. 292 Facebook users entrust their information to
platforms like Facebook with the expectation that those platforms would
use that information to better the users’ experience. However, what has
been alleged is that Facebook, by creating “affinity groups” and “lookalike
audiences” from its users’ information (and especially when such
Facebook-provided features are deployed in defiance of
antidiscrimination laws), 293 has brokered information to employers in a
way that benefits both Facebook and the employer, but not necessarily
the user. I concur with the legal theory then that this brokerage of job
applicant information, in a manner that is inconsistent with the best
interests of the job applicant, violates a fiduciary duty held by the hiring
platform as an information fiduciary.
B.

Discrimination Per Se

As holding corporations responsible for the algorithmic bias of the
automated hiring platforms they use represents a challenging legal
problem because of the difficulty of discovering proof and establishing
intent, I propose a new burden-shifting theory of liability, discrimination
per se. 294 Discrimination per se would allow for a third cause of action

See First Amended Class and Collective Action Complaint, supra note 158, at 21.
See id.
294 Although my proposed doctrine borrows from tort theory, it is important to note that the
National Labor Relations Act characterizes some employer actions as per se violations. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (2018). The statute defines per se violations of the bargaining obligation as conduct that
violates subsection 8(a)(5) without need for further inquiry, including unilateral changes involving
mandatory subjects of bargaining, even when such changes are made in a context that otherwise
indicates good faith bargaining, and even where the changes are partially made in an effort to
comply with governmental requirements. Other per se violations include: An employer bypassing
the union and bargaining directly with employees; insistence to impasse upon permissive subjects
of bargaining; and refusing to execute a written agreement embodying the terms of a negotiated
contract. See Timothy M. McConville, Employer Policies May Be Per Se Violations of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), NAT’L L. REV. (July 12, 2013), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
employer-policies-may-be-se-violations-national-labor-relations-act-nlra [https://perma.cc/8LFLG568].
292
293
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under Title VII. 295 The purpose is to aid plaintiffs who cannot show proof
of disparate treatment or who would have difficulty obtaining the means
to show the statistical proof of disparate impact. Title VII requires intent
for liability to attach, or in the absence of intent, a clear demonstration of
disparate impact with no excuse of business necessity for the disparity. 296
When bringing disparate impact claims, plaintiffs are likely to face three
interrelated obstacles: “(1) compiling the requisite statistics to show that
the policy has a disparate impact . . . (2) identifying a specific policy or
practice that caused the adverse employment decision, and (3) rebutting
the employer’s defense that the policy is justified by a business
necessity.” 297 Also notable, “courts are inconsistent in addressing the
requirement of compiling appropriate statistics to show that a policy has
a disparate impact.” 298 Second, courts often fail to find a “particular
employment practice” that caused the disparity because they cannot
distinguish actual job tasks from the default norms. 299 Many times, courts
use the phrase “particular employment practice” to narrow the
applicability of disparate impact liability. 300
In their essay, Incomprehensible Discrimination, Professors James
Grimmelmann and Daniel Westreich, make the case that when a plaintiff
has met the burden of showing disparate impact, “the defendant’s burden
to show a business necessity requires it to show not just that its model’s

295 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act protects the job applicant against discrimination on the basis
of sex, race, color, national origin, and religion. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2 (2018). Plaintiffs must establish that “a respondent uses a particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact on the basis of [a protected characteristic] and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
296 Proving clear intent is necessary when attempting to make a disparate treatment case under
Title VII. However, under the disparate impact cause of action codified in Title VII, the intent is
implied from an established pattern. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
297 Nicole Buonocore Porter, Synergistic Solutions: An Integrated Approach to Solving the
Caregiver Conundrum for “Real” Workers, 39 STETSON L. REV. 777, 808 (2010) (internal footnotes
omitted).
298 Id.; see, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 989 (2005).
299 See Porter, supra note 297, at 809.
300 Id.
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scores are not just correlated with job performance but explain it.” 301 This
heightened burden acknowledges the information asymmetry that exists
between the employer and the employee in the context of automated
hiring. My proposed doctrine of discrimination per se while concurring
that there is a duty of care owed by the employer, seeks to further rectify
both the information asymmetry and power imbalance present in
automated hiring situations by entirely shifting the burden of proof from
plaintiff to defendant.
Per my proposal, a plaintiff can assert that a hiring practice (for
example, the use of proxy variables resulting in or with the potential to
result in adverse impact to protected categories) is so egregious as to
amount to discrimination per se, and this would shift the burden of proof
from the plaintiff to the defendant (employer) to show that its practice is
non-discriminatory. I do not set forth a specific rule or standard for how
to determine discrimination per se, rather, I think this is a question of law
that, like other types of American legal doctrines, should be generated
through case law. Note also that the discrimination per se doctrine does
not dictate an automatic win for the plaintiff, rather it merely reverses the
American legal tradition of deference to employers and allows that an
employment discrimination plaintiff will at least get a day in court. Note
also that it still remains relatively easy for employers to establish business
necessity for their practices and therefore defeat any plaintiffs’ disparate
impact claims. 302
Discrimination per se is an answer to the question of whether the
liability of corporations could be mitigated by a lack of intent to
301 Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 12, at 170; see also Margot E. Kaminski, Binary
Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV.
1529 (2019) (identifying three categories of concerns in regulating algorithmic decision-making:
dignitary, justificatory, and instrumental); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal
of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1118–26 (2018) (reviewing the rationales
behind calls for explanations of algorithmic decision-making). But see Lilian Edwards & Michael
Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a “‘Right to an Explanation’” Is Probably Not the Remedy You
Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 44 (2017) (arguing that a right to an explanation in
the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is unlikely to present a complete remedy to
algorithmic harms).
302 See Porter, supra note 297, at 810. It is important to note here that even after a defendant has
been able to show business necessity, a plaintiff may nevertheless be able to prevail by showing that
there could be an “alternative employment practice” that meets that “business necessity.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A), (C) (2018); see also Jones v. City of Boston, 845 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2016).
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discriminate or even a lack of awareness that an algorithm is producing
biased results. 303 For example, one researcher, Jatinder Singh, has argued
that the line of responsibility for problems created by machine learning
algorithms is blurred. 304 More specifically, if a machine learning
algorithm can operate without being specifically programmed, by de
novo creating a model from available data, should the blame for any
resulting disparate impact lie with the creator of the algorithm, with the
entity who chose the training data, or with the algorithm itself—with the
last option presuming that the technology is essentially “thinking” on its
own? This, Singh argues, is a question that has yet to be addressed by any
current legal framework. 305
In one attempt to surmount this problem, Professor Stephanie
Bornstein, in the article Reckless Discrimination, 306 theorizes a
recklessness model of discrimination under Title VII, arguing that an
employer should be liable for acts done in reckless negligence, which are
consequences of implicit bias and stereotyping in employment
decisions. 307 In doing so, Professor Bornstein argues that recent
technological advancements have “allowed some employers to easily and
dramatically reduce the biasing effects of subjectivity from their hiring
decisions by, for example, using algorithms instead of people to screen
applicants.” 308
Bornstein explains how employers have made efforts to remove
implicit bias from hiring; they have developed “blind interviews over
online instant messaging software, application-screening algorithms,
pre-commitment to set assessment standards, and more.”309 The author
notes that “[t]he ability to prevent and correct for bias and stereotyping
in the workplace is more affordable and accessible than ever before.”310
She insists that given the development of technological tools, such as
predictive algorithms, which employers can utilize to reduce bias in
303 Professor Charles Sullivan has also grappled with these questions. See Sullivan, supra note
12, at 398.
304 Singh et al., supra note 177.
305 Id.
306 Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, supra note 12.
307 Id. at 1056.
308 Id.
309 Id. at 1058.
310 Id.
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decision-making, an employer that knows about the risks of implicit bias,
has evidence that such bias may infect its decision-making, and fails to
try to prevent it should be liable for discriminatory intent and reckless
action. 311
Building on Professor Bornstein’s line of argumentation, I propose
here that the well-established tort principle of negligence per se should be
the model for creating a new legal framework to answer the question of
intent when it comes to discriminatory results obtained by automated
hiring platforms. While another legal scholar, Professor Girardeau
Spann, has also borrowed from tort doctrine to argue that the
invidiousness of racial discrimination in the United States and the
undeniable concomitant racial disparities dictate the strict liability
standard of res ipsa loquitor for racial discrimination claims, 312 and I
believe that in some instances such a standard might be warranted, I
argue that a discrimination per se standard that is modeled on the
negligence per se standard is more generally applicable (that is, it would
apply to various cases of employment discrimination, not just raciallymotivated discrimination) and also serves to institute more feasible selfregulation practices. The concept of discrimination per se is also in line
with Professor Ford’s argument that employment discrimination law
imposes a duty of care on the employer to ensure that its employment
practices are not unlawfully discriminatory. 313 Note that, as I explain in
another article in progress, Automated Employment Discrimination, the
discrimination per se doctrine should work hand in hand with an
“auditing imperative” imposed on the employer. 314 This takes into
consideration the practical problems associated with proving disparate
impact in an algorithmic hiring scenario and would allow a plaintiff to
have some headway in making the case.
The proto negligence per se case involved a Minnesota drug store
clerk who sold a deadly poison to a customer at the customer’s request. 315
At the time of the sale, the clerk did not label the substance as a “poison,”
Id. at 1110.
See Girardeau A. Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitor, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1025 (2018).
313 See, e.g., Ford, supra note 30 (arguing that employment law imposes a duty of care on
employers to avoid decisions that undermine social equality).
314 I discuss the “auditing imperative” in a forthcoming article. Ajunwa, supra note 91.
315 Osborne v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543 (Minn. 1889).
311
312
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which was required by a state statute for the sales of such substances.316
Later, the customer who had purchased the substance ingested the
chemical, which caused her death. 317 Given these facts, should the clerk
have been held legally liable for his actions, which indirectly caused the
customer’s death? This case, Osborne v. McMasters, became one of the
earliest cases in the United States to analyze the illegal concept of
negligence per se. Given the facts of the case, the court first found that
there could be no “serious doubt of defendant’s liability”—as he had
known of his duty to label the bottle as poison. 318 In explanation, the court
detailed that it was
well settled . . . that where a statute or municipal ordinance
imposes upon any person a specific duty for the protection or
benefit of others, if he neglects to perform that duty he is liable
to those for whose protection or benefit it was imposed for any
injuries of the character which the statute or ordinance was
designed to prevent. . . . 319
Since the time of Osborne, the doctrine of negligence per se has
become commonly used for violations of laws such as traffic laws,
building codes, blood alcohol content limits, and various federal laws. 320
For example, in Mikula v. Tailors, an Ohio business invitee was taken to
the emergency room after falling down in a snow-covered parking lot at
the place of business to which she was invited. 321 Witnesses report to have
seen her fall after stepping into a hole in the parking lot that was about
seven inches deep and had been covered by the snowfall from that day.
After careful consideration, the jury determined that:

Id.
Id.
318 Id. at 543.
319 Id.
320 See, e.g., Williams v. Calhoun, 333 S.E.2d 408 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (in which the defendant’s
failure to stop at a stop sign constituted negligence per se); Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr.,
Inc., 187 P.3d 565 (Colo. 2008) (in which an outdoor education teacher fell off of a ladder that was
in violation of building code restrictions, establishing negligence per se on the part of the
landowner); Purchase v. Meyer, 737 P.2d 661 (Wash. 1987) (in which a cocktail lounge was found
negligent per se for serving alcohol to a minor).
321 Mikula v. Tailors, 263 N.E.2d 316 (Ohio 1970).
316
317
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[a] deep hole in a parking lot which is filled or covered, or both,
by a natural accumulation of snow constitutes a condition, the
existence of which the owner of the premises is bound, in the
exercise of reasonable care, to know. He is also bound to know
that a natural accumulation of snow which fills or covers the
hole is a condition substantially more dangerous than that
normally associated with snow. . . . Under such circumstances,
the owner’s failure to correct the condition constitutes
actionable negligence. 322
Moreover, failure to correct an issue can also lend itself to negligence
per se claims if the accused individual is found to have violated a statute
by their failure to respond to a problem. For example, in Miller v.
Christian, a landlord was found negligent per se, after being placed on
notice from a tenant that the building’s sewage system had recurring
problems. 323 Failure to “fix[] the immediate problem within a reasonable
amount of time” resulted in a backup of the sewage system, which caused
the tenant’s apartment to flood, ruining much of her personal property. 324
The court in Miller found that Allan Christian, the landlord, was liable
for the damage to the tenant’s property because he had a legal duty to
maintain the apartment’s sewage system in addition to being legally
obligated to keep the premises fit for habitation. 325
Often, “failure to correct” claims entail a consideration of whether
the plaintiff knew of the problem, as it is presumed that a plaintiff with
knowledge of an existing problem would be reasonable enough to avoid
injury by the issue altogether. In one case, Walker v. RLI Enterprises, Inc.,
a tenant in an apartment building sued her landlord after she stepped out
the back door of the building and slipped on a sheet of ice. 326 She suffered
serious injuries to her ankle. 327 In her suit, the tenant asserted that the
landlord was negligent in maintaining the property, because she had
given him notice of a leaky water faucet by the back door of her

322
323
324
325
326
327

Id. at 322–23.
Miller v. Christian, 958 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1234.
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 333(b)(1) (2019).
Walker v. RLI Enters., Inc., No. 89325, 2007 WL 4442725, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
Id.
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apartment. 328 This negligence, the court determined, was negligence per
se because the landlord had an obligation to maintain the premises under
Ohio law. 329
At trial, however, the landlord argued that “a landlord is only liable
where the landlord has ‘superior knowledge’ of the defect that led to the
injury.” 330 By this, the landlord meant that as the tenant had alerted him
of the problem, the tenant then clearly knew as much about the dangerous
conditions as he did. He also noted that she had taken no further action
to avoid the leaky faucet and could thus be responsible for her own
injury. 331 However, the court found this argument unconvincing, holding
that such an argument only applies in the context of natural
accumulations of ice and snow, because most people have experienced
such conditions and know that they should take precautions. 332 Sitespecific problems, though, are the responsibility of the landlord to
correct, as he likely has a “superior knowledge” of the issues on the
property than his tenants or site visitors. 333
In the case of automated hiring systems, employers have an
obligation not to unlawfully discriminate against applicants, as
proscribed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and other federal
antidiscrimination laws. Furthermore, as I propose in a separate paper, if
self-audits or external audits of hiring algorithms become mandated by
law, 334 then it follows that when an employer willfully neglects to audit
and correct its automated hiring systems for unlawful bias, a prima facie
intent to discriminate could be implied, pursuant to the proposed
doctrine of discrimination per se. This argument becomes persuasive
when one considers that some corporations make use of bespoke internal
hiring algorithms, such that no one, except the corporation, has access to
the hiring algorithm and its results—meaning then that only the
corporation could have “superior knowledge” of any problems of bias.

Id.
Id. at *2.
330 Id. at *5.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 I discuss the proposal for mandated self and external audits of hiring algorithms in another
article, Automated Employment Discrimination. Ajunwa, supra note 91.
328
329
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There are two important arguments against the introduction of the
discrimination per se doctrine: (1) the difficulty of establishing a standard
for when the doctrine might apply; (2) it imposes too large a burden on
the employer. Regarding the first, I agree that it will take some work on
the parts of the courts to establish clear precedents for when the doctrine
could apply. But this is true for any new legal doctrine. In fact, even
established legal doctrines still face contestation as to when they should
or should not apply. 335 Consider that in the context of automated hiring,
the two legal doctrines currently available to the plaintiff on which to
build a case are disparate treatment or disparate impact. The fact is that
there are very few cases of disparate treatment because employers are now
much too sophisticated to leave the kind of “smoking gun” evidence
required. For disparate impact, the problem is that there is wide
discrepancy in determining what statistics are enough to show a pattern
of disparate impact. 336
Regarding the burden on employers, the fact remains that
automated hiring is a cost-saving measure. Employers save significant
amounts of money and time by using automated hiring platforms.
However, automated hiring platforms should not save employers from
their duty not to discriminate. Just like an employer holds a responsibility
to supervise its human workers for activities that might contravene the
law, so, too, remains an obligation to audit automated hiring systems for
bias. This burden is neither heavier than when the intermediary is
human, nor does it disappear merely because the intermediary is a set of
algorithms. The doctrine of discrimination per se is meant to prevent
employers from shirking their responsibility.

335 See Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
371, 415–16 (2001) (noting that because men are not usually primary caregivers, women have a
difficult time finding comparisons to prove a disparate impact); Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate
Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 769 (2006) (stating that establishing a statistically
significant impact might be difficult unless the affected population is sufficiently large and diverse).
336 William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81, 113 (2009)
(noting that courts are inconsistent in applying the disparate impact doctrine).
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Consumer Protection for Job Applicants

Another method for ensuring the accountability of hiring
algorithms is to view the job applicant as a consumer and, thus, as
deserving consumer protection for unfair algorithmic outcomes. This
approach could potentially allow for both the maker of the platform and
the employer to be held liable. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 337
while typically thought to solely govern the distribution of credit reports,
could potentially be leveraged when an employer relies on information
from third parties—namely, an application prescreener or a hiring
algorithm software. 338 Note that while the FCRA would not be able to
directly hold the employer accountable for any discriminatory use of the
data, the point of my proposal here is that the procedural aspects of the
FCRA may also enable the job applicant to discover if the employer had
access to discriminatory information or even to establish a pattern of
discriminatory information furnished to the employer for protected
groups, thus perhaps assisting in a disparate impact cause of action.
First, some brief details about the language and intentions of the
FCRA. The FCRA, passed in 1970, was initially intended to protect
consumers who were being “scanned” for creditworthiness. The language
set forth by the FCRA was applied primarily to the “Big Three” credit
reporting agencies—Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion—all of which
would draw up reports about consumers, using their personal
information to determine their credit eligibility. 339 They would then
submit these reports to banks and employers, showing the “risk” of the
current individual in terms of lending or employment. As such, the FCRA
was passed to prevent unfair or opaque credit reporting. 340
The law also protects consumers from unfair background checks
and unauthorized collections of their private information, ensuring that
consumers are alerted to any information that may adversely affect their
abilities to obtain either credit or, more recently enforced,

See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2018).
Pauline T. Kim & Erika Hanson, People Analytics and the Regulation of Information Under
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 17 (2016).
339 Id. at 26.
340 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a.
337
338
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employment. 341 Moreover, the law also protects consumers by providing
that creditors or employers must disclose “in writing to the consumer
who is the subject of the communication, not later than 5 business days
after receiving any request from the consumer for such disclosure, the
nature and substance of all information in the consumer’s file at the time
of the request . . . .” 342 Through such provisions, the FCRA gives
consumers more control over how their personal information is reported
by consumer reporting agencies and used by both banks and employers.
However, since the time of its passage, the FCRA has expanded its
bounds such that it no longer only applies to the “Big Three” credit
reporting agencies. 343 Now, it also applies to a variety of agencies that
collect and sell information that is found outside the workplace and that
might be pertinent for applicant-reviewing purposes. 344 With the
coverage of many consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) whose sole
purpose is employment prescreening, a question has arisen regarding the
point at which a screening service should be considered a CRA by the
FCRA. In essence, how big of a role does a reporting agency have to play
in the information collection and reporting process in order to face such
substantial government regulation?
The language of the FCRA plainly defines the characteristics of
entities that can be considered CRAs, as well as the content of reports that
can be considered “consumer reports” under the law. A CRA, by
definition, is any “person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a
cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the
practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or
other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer

Id. § 1681k(a).
Id. § 1681a(o)(5)(C)(i).
343 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, LIST OF CONSUMER REPORTING COMPANIES (2020),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201604_cfpb_list-of-consumer-reporting-companies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y8LW-9JFS].
344 See, e.g., CHECKR, https://Checkr.com [https://perma.cc/9ECB-2RVN] (which screens
applicants for criminal records, driving records, and also provides employment verifications,
international verifications, and drug screenings); HIRERIGHT, https://www.hireright.com [https://
perma.cc/6RC7-QJP8] (which boasts the industry’s broadest collection of on-demand screening
applications); FIRST ADVANTAGE, https://www.fadv.com [https://perma.cc/S3YC-ADFW] (which
provides criminal and pre-employment background checks, as well as drug-testing and tenant
screening services).
341
342
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reports to third parties.”345 Application screening software companies
could be considered CRAs, as they regularly process and evaluate “other
information on consumers” for the purpose of providing reports to
employers.
Furthermore, these companies arguably develop “consumer
reports,” judging by the legal definition of that term. The FCRA defines
“consumer report[s]” as
any written, oral, or other communication of any information
by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is
used or expected to be used . . . as a factor in establishing the
consumer’s
eligibility
for . . . credit
or
346
insurance . . . or . . . employment purposes.
Through an analysis of the terms of service of two algorithm-based
employment screening companies—Monster Hiring and Paycor—it
becomes clear that the reports that these kinds of corporations create
could certainly qualify as consumer reports, where the “consumers” are
job applicants.
Monster, a networking platform intended to connect job seekers to
available employers, states in its terms of service that it retains the ability
to “collect information about [consumers] from publicly-available
websites and may use this information to create a Profile or append it to
an existing Profile” on the company’s website. 347 This information—in
addition to any information users choose to add—is then arranged in a
profile format on Monster’s website, where employers can pay to post job
listings and view applicant resumes. 348 For an example of the service costs,
the cost to post and promote one job ad on Monster is $399 for a sixtyday post longevity. 349 That cost includes the distribution of one job ad on
Monster’s “job board” as well as “[a]ccess to 20 recommended resumes
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).
Id. § 1681a(d)(1)(A)–(B).
347 See Terms of Use, MONSTER, http://inside.monster.com/terms-of-use [https://perma.cc/
9XHR-3VPA].
348 See Monster: Job Board Overview for Employers plus FAQs and Pricing, BETTERTEAM, https://
www.betterteam.com/monster [https://perma.cc/EYV7-62EY].
349 Id.
345
346
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from the Monster resume database”—from job-seekers selected by
Monster, per the qualifications an employer lists in the job description. 350
Effectively, the process of arranging profiles in its own structured form,
the ability to add information the company finds online, and the practice
of recommending “suitable” applicants after an employer pays for a job
post all seem to show that Monster exercises reasonable control over the
information it releases. 351 Thus, it could certainly be argued that Monster
is creating a report that has
bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing,
credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be
used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving
as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility
for . . . employment purposes. 352
Most specifically, by retaining the right to add any information it
discovers online, it is clear that Monster takes an active role in
distributing information related to an applicant’s job prospects, making
its reports qualify as “consumer reports” under the definition of the
FCRA.
Another instance in which the FCRA might be applied to algorithm
hiring platforms is in the case of platforms in which “consumers”—or job
applicants—have even less control over the information that is collected
and reported, such as the case of Paycor. Paycor is, for all purposes, a
background check access provider, although it also advertises resumeparsing tools and interview-streamlining data reports. 353 The software
platform advertises to employers that it takes in applicant information
and “intelligently stores that information into the correct fields of the
candidate profile, which means errors from manually inputting data are

Id.
Levy & Barocas, supra note 278.
352 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2018).
353 See Recruiting Software & Applicant Tracking System, PAYCOR, https://www.paycor.com/
recruiting-software [https://perma.cc/K9UF-YUSV]. Paycor recently acquired Newton. See
Announcement: Newton Is Now Paycor Recruiting, PAYCOR, https://www.paycor.com/newtonsoftware [https://perma.cc/LF3U-R4ZK].
350
351
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a thing of the past.” 354 From these profiles, employers can find employees
to fit the requirements of the job descriptions they release. 355 Then,
Paycor gives employers access to background check software provided by
third parties, which Paycor itself entirely oversees. 356 Given these features,
I argue that Paycor has enough of a hand in the report-creating process
as to have the final reports attributed to itself, making its reports
“consumer reports.”
The information-analyzing services put forth by Paycor are certainly
more hands-on than those of Monster. Paycor acquires sensitive
information from third-party background checkers, after overviewing the
background screening process, and then relays a report about the
screening to its clients. Further, by parsing resumes and creating new,
standardized profiles on applicants for employers to reference, Paycor is
certainly changing the nature of the resumes that prospective employees
have submitted and is thereby creating its own reports with added
information. All of this data, which Paycor relays to employers, can, and
likely will, be used to determine employment eligibility. Therefore, under
the language of the FCRA, the reports put forth by Paycor qualify as
“consumer reports.”
Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the body that
oversees the FCRA, has recently held that “[j]ust saying you’re not a
consumer reporting agency isn’t enough.”357 The case, which took place
in 2013, dealt with an application available for purchase on iTunes,
Filiquarian Publishing, which advertised that it could make “‘quick
criminal background check[s] for convictions’ in specific states.” 358 The
application had access to “hundreds of thousands of criminal records”
and could help employers discover if any of the convictions could be

354 See Paycor Recruiting: Find Quality Candidates and Fill Open Positions Fast, PAYCOR (Oct. 4,
2019), https://www.paycor.com/resource-center/recruitment-tools [https://perma.cc/3MS9TVDK].
355 See id.
356 Recruiting Software & Applicant Tracking System, supra note 353.
357 Tony Rodriguez & Jessica Lyon, Background Screening Reports and the FCRA: Just Saying
You’re Not a Consumer Reporting Agency Isn’t Enough, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 10, 2013,
2:00 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2013/01/background-screeningreports-fcra-just-saying-youre-not [https://perma.cc/9YEN-QXKH].
358 Id.
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attributed to their applicants. 359 However, Filiquarian also reported in a
disclaimer on its site that it was not a consumer reporting agency because
its background screening reports were not to be considered screening
products for insurance, employment, loans, or credit applications. 360 The
FTC took issue with this, finding that Filiquarian provided the exact same
information as CRAs, but simply said they didn’t use the information for
employment purposes, which is not a reasonable excuse from FCRA
compliance. 361 Ultimately, the FTC’s statement was the following:
“Companies offering background screening products for employment or
other FCRA purposes . . . have to stay in line with the law.” 362 This
mandate should be applied to sites like Monster and Paycor, given that
they provide similar screening services.
If these companies were to be considered consumer reporting
agencies under the FCRA down the road, Monster, Paycor, and other
similar reporting services that find their own information to conduct
screening checks might also leave themselves open to FCRA claims for
failing to “follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible
accuracy of [their] files,” which causes individuals to be denied
employment opportunities. 363 In one case, Thompson v. San Antonio
Retail Merchants Ass’n (SARMA), the Fifth Circuit found that SARMA
had erred in its creation of a profile for Thompson, automatically
“capturing” the incorrect social security number for his profile and
erroneously reporting the bad credit history of another man by the same
common name. The court ultimately held that under the FCRA, such an
oversight by a credit reporting agency as the one presented in Thompson
was enough to show negligence on the part of the agency. 364
One potential rebuttal to the classification of hiring algorithms as
CRAs can be extrapolated from Professor M. Ryan Calo’s article, Open

Id.
Id.
361 Id.
362 Id.
363 Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchs. Ass’n, 682 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 1982); see also
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546 (2016) (in which a “people search engine” provided
incorrect personal information about a consumer to employers and the Supreme Court ruled that
this established concrete injury to the consumer, by damaging his employment prospects).
364 Thompson, 682 F.2d 509.
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Robotics. 365 With reference to the robotics community, Professor Calo
argues that just as firearms manufacturers are ultimately not responsible
for what end users do with their products, manufacturers of open robotics
platforms should not be held responsible either. 366 When applied to the
regulation of hiring algorithms that develop reports about prospective
employees, one could make a similar argument, holding that hiring
algorithms and their developers are not ultimately responsible for the
negative impacts that employers use them to create. Instead, the
consumers—in this case, employers—who use such platforms may be
responsible for the decisions that they make once they purchase the hiring
tools.
However, hiring platform developers differ significantly from
firearm manufacturers or open robotics platforms, given that those
developers hold the power to create features that may enable employment
discrimination and also given that automated hiring platforms exercise
considerable control over how applicants’ job applications may be
captured, analyzed, and presented to employers. These differences bolster
the argument for classifying entities that screen applicants’ information
to create hiring reports as CRAs under the law. In doing so, job
applicants, as consumers, could gain some insight as to how they are
evaluated, and society could regain some measure of checks over the
information that is used to “screen” candidates as part of the automated
hiring trend. Furthermore, the classification of hiring platforms as CRAs
would assist the information gathering of a would-be employment
discrimination plaintiff in the bid to discover whether information
denoting protected class membership has been made available to an
employer.
CONCLUSION
Proponents of algorithmic decision-making have favorably likened
its workings to that of an oracle. For those adherents, the algorithm is allknowing and will infallibly provide the answers the intrepid inquirer
seeks. This represents a simplistic understanding of the opaque nature of

365
366

M. Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571 (2011).
Id. at 576, 604–05.
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an oracle. Consider the ur-Oracle, the Oracle of Delphi. 367 The Oracle, a
figure known in Greek mythology, spoke veraciously, but in truth that
was spun in riddle and with many strands of interpretation. 368 In the most
famous tale of the Oracle, the King of Lydia—who faced a war against the
Persians—asked for the Oracle’s advice. However, the King failed to fully
interrogate the Oracle and did so at his own peril, departing with a
seemingly simple answer that “if [he] went to war then a great empire
would surely fall.” 369 Of course, this advice was highly vulnerable to
misinterpretation, and the King’s own empire later fell to the Persians. 370
Similarly, algorithms deployed in the decision-making process are
vulnerable to misinterpretation and misuse. Although automated hiring
platforms offer efficiency to the hiring process, we must continue to
interrogate their results to ensure they are working in furtherance of the
shared goal of an equal opportunity society.

367 See WILLIAM J. BROAD, THE ORACLE: ANCIENT DELPHI AND THE SCIENCE BEHIND ITS LOST
SECRETS (2006).
368 See Mark Cartwright, Delphi, ANCIENT HIST. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 22, 2013), https://
www.ancient.eu/delphi [https://perma.cc/GS3E-MRTV].
369 See id.
370 See id.

